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CHAPTER

I:

INTRODUCTION

A. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE

In the last fifteen years,

a

penetrating and

irreversible revolution has occurred in the world'
financial markets. The globalization of financial markets
and institutions along with innovative investments

strategies are two of the hallmarks featuring this change.
Investors and managers can now use new instruments, such as

derivatives involving new strategies,

for guarding against

the always omnipresent financial risks. Derivatives are

financial instruments whose returns are derived from other
assets or variables. Futures and options are among the best
known. Although derivative markets have been around in

different forms for centuries, their growth has accelerated

rapidly in the last ten years. Financial experts advocate
that thanks to these instruments,

financial markets in the

United States and throughout the world are more efficient
which in turn contribute to economic welfare. During the
last decade, more complex, more sophisticated derivatives

were introduced and the last years disasters due to
1

s

2

derivatives pepper the financial press. In October 1993,
for example,

the Financial Times reported that the

Bundesbank warned that the growth of derivatives markets
could endanger the stability of the world financial

system

1
.

The German Central bank argued that "the increase

in the use of options,

futures and other complex derivative

instruments has led to an interlinking of the world'
financial markets that makes them more vulnerable to
crisis 2 ." On February 25-26,

1995,

the oldest British

merchant bank Baring Brothers collapsed. A 28 year-old
employee based in Singapore, trading futures and options
contracts, had accumulated losses exceeding £860 million.

Baring's capital was £540 million. A rescue effort by the
Bank of England failed. Other banks would not lend to

Barings because with derivatives contracts still open the
full extent of Barings' losses could not be fixed. This

crisis, among many others,

raises important issues

concerning the use and regulation of derivatives,

particularly in the futures and options markets. The
financial markets are growing in new directions. More

sophisticated, more complex, products are introduced

primarily to meet the individual financial needs of bank
customers. Derivatives become highly successful risk

management tools but the dramatic growth in the use of
derivatives has prompted expressions of concern from U.S.

3

financial regulators and Congress. For the most part, the

concerns that have been raised have focused on the

difficulty of assessing the various risks associated with
derivative products. For example, the Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency must ensure that national banks
engaging in derivative transactions, either as dealers or
as end-users,

have the ability to accurately assess the

risks associated with financial derivative activities and

have sound risk management systems. To what extent is the

regulatory framework sufficient to protect the financial
system? Are other safeguards needed? Is greater

coordination between regulators and regulated parties
needed? What are the implications of derivative actions for

deposit-taking institutions? These are the main issues that
I

am addressing and analyzing in this thesis. The main

concern is that bank managers who make large bets on price

movements use private clients money. This is what
derivatives are all about. Therefore, the regulators must
ensure that banks that engage in derivative contracts have
the ability to accurately assess the risks associated with

these products and have sound risk management systems in

order to prevent insolvencies. The delicate task and, may
be dilemma,
a

that regulators face is to allow innovation in

safe and sound manner without smothering new activities

with superfluous burdensome restrictions. Bank Regulators

4

have two main concerns about derivatives. The first is that

poor management or lack of understanding of these

complicated instruments could cause companies and banks to
incur heavy losses. For example,

in late 1993,

a

trading

subsidiary of Metallgesellschaft, the German oil and metals
company,

faced final losses of one billion on dealings in

the oil derivative markets 3

.

The second concern is the

broader impact on other financial markets, particularly

whether derivatives have a destabilising influence.
Additionally, the regulators agree that the poor existing

regulation is outdated and possibly ineffective. New
regulation is needed.

B.

SCOPE OF THE THESIS

While the thesis focuses on the analysis of the legal
aspects of the derivative instruments regulation, it is not

addressing and analyzing the economical and pure financial
aspects of these markets. Nevertheless, the reader will

notice the important implication of some technical jargon

which inevitably needs to be used for our purpose.
This thesis examines the legal issues involved in the

trade of derivatives. It centers primarily on the most

common derivative instruments such as futures and options
but there are, of course, numerous other financial products

5

available and many other types of futures and options
exist. The thesis sketches and analyses the risks users

encounter in trading these products and the tools available
to governments and agencies to manage and reduce these

risks in the United States.

C.

ORGANIZATION

Chapter

I

provides a general introduction to the

subject and describes the reasons why derivatives are

considered to be

a

hot topic.

Chapter II presents a brief

statement of the basic concepts of banking regulation in
the United States and summarizes the role played by the

different regulatory agencies. Chapter III then turns to
the analysis of the origin, growth of derivative markets

and informs the reader about the integration and

globalization of financial markets. Chapter IV deals with
the definition and examination of futures and options, two
of the most common derivative products used in the

financial markets. It further discusses and illustrates
their functioning and establishes the rational principles
that should be mastered to understand the dynamics

associated with derivatives and the way they work. Chapter

V covers the study and examination of the omnipresent risks
associated with the use of derivatives. Chapter VI focuses

on recent litigation cases and analyzes the existing

regulation. It then highlights the needs for more

regulatory actions.
Chapter VII explores the U.S. bank supervisory
initiatives and proposed regulation of banks' derivative

activities by the regulatory agencies and the Self-

Regulatory Organizations. Chapter VIII surveys the latest
federal legislative initiatives for the supervision and

regulation of derivatives of banks and is followed by my
final comments and conclusions.

CHAPTER II:
-

BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
BASIC FEATURES

A. RATIONALES FOR BANKING REGULATION

Banks are among the most regulated industries of all,
not only in the United States but worldwide. Over the years
a

blend of customs, understandings, administrative practice

and formal law has given rise to an affluence of rules that

bind and govern banks as well as the regulatory agencies
charged with their oversight. The goals that must be

achieved by

a

regulatory system for the financial services

industry are efficiency of regulation, flexibility, fair
dealing,

safety and soundness, avoidance of concentration,

and efficient implementation of monetary policy

4
.

Efficiency of regulation is achieved when financial
regulators and regulations distort the behavior of market

participants only to the extent required to achieve valid
public policy goals 5
ability of

a

.

Flexibility in regulation is the

regulatory system to adapt to changes in the

regulated industry without distorting the regulatory

8

the industry,

system,

or the marketplace generally 6

.

The

lack of flexibility is one of the major problems in

financial regulation today. From the perspective of
financial institutions, safety and soundness considerations

mean that

a

regulatory system should prevent institutional

failures when harm to the financial marketplace would

result 7

.

This type of regulation is intended to prevent

banks from failing through controlling risks and ensuring

adequate capital 8

.

Preventing failure avoids deposit-

insurance pay-outs and systemic risk (i.e., a chain

reaction of bank failures through interbank deposit linkage
or payment settlement systems 9

)

.

In theory,

that goal is

achieved by protecting small depositors with deposit
large banks have become so

insurance. In practice, however,

dependent upon uninsured deposits that the "conf idence" of
the uninsured,

institutional investor has provided the link

between deposits at an individual bank and the stability of
the financial system as a whole 10

.

The banking regulators

and lawmakers have always been concerned by concentration
of financial power, possible conflicts of interest and the

appropriate scope of risks banks could incur. Banks are in
someway special and should therefore be distinguished from
other financial or nonfinancial institutions. Why are they
special? These financial firms have a special role to play
in a modern economy. Financial institutions help households

9

and firms to save; they also facilitate the complex

payments among many elements of the economy and in the case
of commercial banks they serve as conduits for the

government's monetary policy 11

.

More specifically they are

special for three reasons. First, because they offer

transaction accounts 12

.

The liquidity,

the mobility and

acceptability of the these accounts permit our economic and
financial system to work with relative ease and

efficiency 13

.

On the other hand, banks can also create,

through their lending activities, transaction deposits 14

.

Banks are indeed, the primary source of liquidity for
all others classes and sizes of institutions, both

financial and nonf inancial. Finally, banks are the

transmission belt for the monetary policy 15

.

The fact that

banks are subject to reserve requirements place the banking

system in the unique position of being the transmission
belt through which the actions and policies of the central

bank have their effect on financial market conditions 16

.

These are the main reasons why banks have been strictly

regulated.

10

B.

DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES

-

BANK

RUNS AND SYSTEMIC RISK

1.

The Dual Banking System

Ever since the Civil war, the American banking

industry has operated under a system of overlapping state
and federal regulation 17

.

The dual banking system comes out

of a federalist tradition: unwillingness to concentrate too

much power in the national government 18
a

.

Under this system,

bank is chartered, examined and regulated as either a

national bank, under the National Bank Act 19 or as a state

chartered bank under any one of the fifty-two different
state banking laws 20

.

A bank that obtains

a state

charter

is referred to as a state bank while a bank that obtains a

federal charter is known as a national bank. By selecting
one chartering authority rather than another, banks can

determine the nature of the regulations to which they will
be subject as well as the identity of the government agency

that exercises the regulatory function.

2.

Bank Ru ns and Sy stemic Risk

The principle of fractional reserves states that banks

will never have more than a small portion of depositors'
funds on hand in the form of cash 21

.

As a result,

if a run

starts and many depositors demand withdrawal, the bank will

11

not be able to satisfy its customers. The bank's depositors

have the right to withdraw on demand. If they hear rumors,
they can take their funds out in a matter of minutes 22
example,

.

For

speculation in the security business during the

1920s by banks and their affiliates resulted in tremendous

losses when the securities markets soured. These losses

undermined depositor confidence and caused

a

rash of bank

runs, which led in turn to many bank insolvencies and an

unstable money supply. Bank runs and panics are frightening
events and today when they occur it is largely in the form
of electronic or mail withdrawals placed from remote

locations rather than by means of panicky mobs 23

.

However,

bank runs and panics are rare today thanks to federal
deposit insurance which covers accounts at insured banks up
to $100,000 per depositor per institution 24

.

A bank run

is

in no one's best interest. Even if the bank has become

insolvent, everyone would be better off if closure occurred

through an orderly process in which the bank could maximize
the value of its assets rather than selling them at "fire

sale" prices in order to satisfy depositor demands 25

.

In

considering bank runs and panics, it is necessary to

distinguish commercial banks and open-end mutual funds.
These two institutions might be involved in the derivative

markets but mutual funds are not subject to runs in the
same way as banks are. Indeed, the liabilities of open-end

12

funds are in the form of demand equity rather than demand

debt 26

.

Because the fund pays out investors based on net
there is virtually no chance that the fund

asset value,

will become economically insolvent as a result of investor

withdrawals 27

.

It remains theoretically possible that an

open-end fund would suffer

a

temporary or "liquidity"

insolvency if depositors demanded withdrawal more quickly
than the fund could liquidate its assets to pay them 28
This possibility, however,

.

is virtually eliminated by the

fact that the assets of an open-end fund are typically

devoted almost entirely to short-term securities with ready
markets 29 and these assets can be converted to cash in

matter of hours.

For these reasons,

a

runs on open-end funds

are virtually nonexistent despite the fact that they do not

carry federal deposit insurance. More frequent and more
frightening on a greater scale than bank runs is Systemic
risk. Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one

bank will lead to the failure of other banks 30

.

Even with

the best supervisory control system, a chain reaction can

result from the linkage of interbank deposits 31

.

One bank

can hold sizable deposits of other banks and if that bank
fails,

the other banks could fail as well. Another chain

reaction can arise through payment system linkage 32

.

If one

bank fails to settle its position in a net settlement

system for large value payments (for example, the Clearing

13

House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS)
States)

in the United

other banks, which do not get paid, may in turn

fail. Finally,

a

imitative runs 33

.

chain reaction can happen through

When one bank fails, depositors in other

banks may assume that their banks may also fail and so

withdraw their funds, exposing these banks to

a

liquidity

crisis and ultimately to failure. We now turn away from the

industry itself to look briefly to its regulators.

C.

BANK REGULATORY AGENCIES

Made possible largely by new technology, the
integration of financial markets and services has broadened
the scope of the financial industry. But globalization and

integration raise important legal issues relating both to
the regulatory and supervisory function of governments and
to the mutual rights and obligations of the participating

parties. It also emphasizes, in this context of

transnational activities, the need for uniform rules and
for internationally accepted methods for the application of

those rules and the settlement of disputes. These

developments and their inevitable conflicting undertones
have strongly influenced the actions of public institutions

interested in the banking industry in each country. The

diversity of such institutions within the same national

,

,

14

jurisdiction is not to be underestimated. In the United
States alone the wide range of regulators demanding the

attention of banks includes the Federal Reserve, the US
the Department

Treasury,

the Comptroller of the Currency,

of Labor,

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)

,

(FDIC)

(FSLIC)

the state bank

supervisors, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
the state Securities Commissioners, the state insurance

departments, and the Self-Regulatory Organizations

(SROs)

such as the stock, options and commodity exchanges, and the

National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
In addition to national authorities,

34
.

international

institutions and groups are deeply concerned with the

regulation of international banking. These include, in
addition to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Bank of
International Settlements, its standing Committee on Bank

Regulations and Supervisory Practices (the Basle
Committee)

,

the Contact Group of the European Economic

Community, the Institute for International Finance and a

host of regional and subregional supervisory groups 35

.

With so many agencies and different statutes it is no

wonder that disparities in regulation exist. While the
scope of this thesis does not include the analysis of all
the regulatory agencies and their disparities,

it will

15

highlight and examine those who play an important role in
the regulation of derivative activities.

In this regard,

the primary federal commercial bank regulators are the

Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

1.

The Board of Governors of the F ederal Reserve

System
Under the Federal Reserve Act 36

,

Congress empowered

the Federal Reserve Board to manage the nation'

s

money

supply and to supervise State Banks which are members of
the federal reserve system 37

holding companies 38

.

,

National Banks, and bank

State Members banks are subject to

examination by both federal and state bank examiners 39

2.

.

The Off ice of the Comptroller of the Currency

National Banks are chartered 40

,

examined 41 and

regulated 42 by the Comptroller of the Currency. A National

Bank must obtain the express consent of the OCC before it

may engage in activities not expressly provided for in
either statute or regulation 43

.

State banks are regulated

by their respective state agencies. Each of the fifty
states,

the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, has its

own particular banking act providing for the authorization,

16

chartering, regulation, and examination of its State

Banks 44

.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

3.

The FDIC exercises residential supervisory authority

over National Banks and State Member Banks 45

.

The FDIC also

directs supervisory authority over State Banks which elect
to obtain federal deposit insurance,

even if they are not

members of the Federal Reserve System ("State Nonmember
Banks'')

46
.

The FDIC has claimed the authority to regulate

the scope of powers that a State Nonmember Bank may

exercise under section
Act 47

Section

.

6

6

of the Federal Deposit Insurance

requires the FDIC to determine, before

approving deposit insurance, "whether or not the applying
bank'

s

corporate powers are consistent with the purpose of

the FDIC Act." 48 The FDIC is also able to exercise

regulatory authority over State Banks for which it ensures
deposits ("Insured State Banks'') by virtue of its power to
terminate deposit insurance 49

.

Justifications for the FDIC

terminating deposit insurance may include, for example,

determining that the bank has engaged in unsafe or unsound
practices 50

.

Finally, the FDIC handles failures of insured

institutions and has authority to act as conservator of
institutions that are in danger of default and as receiver
of failed institutions 51

.

17

4.

State Re gulators

State-chartered banks, savings and loans, savings
banks are supervised and regulated by

agencies 52

5.

a

variety of state

.

Complexi ty of the System

National banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the

Currency and state banks are regulated by their respective
state agency. Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
are regulated by the Federal Reserve. Banks that are

insured by the FDIC are also regulated by the FDIC. Because
all national banks must be members of the Federal Reserve

and all Federal Reserve member banks must hold FDIC
insurance, national banks are regulated by the Comptroller,
the Federal Reserve and FDIC. State banks are regulated by

their respective state agency, the Federal Reserve if they
are members of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC if they

carry insurance from FDIC. The development of the dual

banking system has created a banking regulatory scheme that
is not only complex but is also non-uniform between

National and State Banks.

18

D.

BANKING AND SECURITIES ACTIVITIES: THE GLASS-

STEAGALL ACT

1.

The Glass -Steaaall Wall

Responding to political charges that the Depression of
1933 had been caused by bank speculation in securities,

the

Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial banking from
investment banking. The separation of investment banking

activities from commercial banking activities fosters

public confidence in the banking system because it protects
banks against the risks inherent in the securities

business 53

.

Securities firms were not allowed to accept

deposits or affiliate with deposit-taking institutions and

commercial bank members of the Federal Reserveeral Reserve

System were barred from participating, either directly or
indirectly,

in many aspects of the securities business.

Banks have limited securities powers. They can only

underwrite government debt, but they can be involved in

brokerage activities 54

.

Banking affiliates- non bank

subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies- can do more. They
can underwrite corporate debt and equity securities through
so called § 32 20 subsidiaries,

so long as they are not

"engaged principally" (more than 10% of Gross Revenue) in
these activities 55

.

The separation of securities activities

from banking activities is justified by the potential

19

conflicts of interest that could result 56
a

.

For example,

if

bank was allowed to underwrite securities, it could

advise its corporate customers to purchase these securities
and could threaten to cut off future loans if the customers

did not oblige 57

2.

.

The Breakdown of the Glass -Steaaall Wall

The separation wall between investment and commercial

banking is crumbling and is about to fall. Competition and
market forces pushed nonbanks to invade the commercial

banking field by offering money market funds with checking

privileges 58

Securities firms also invaded the banking

.

market of making commercial loans by means of commercial
paper market 59

.

Banks have counterattacked by invading the

securities business. They now serve as investment advisors
to mutual funds,

act as stock brokers and compete with

securities firms in the market for placing commercial paper

with buyers 60

.

Even more significantly, securities

subsidiaries of bank holding companies have been allowed to
engage in the full range of traditional securities
activities, including the underwriting of corporate debt

and equity issues 61

.

Furthermore, there have been

discussions and debates in Congress to repeal the Glass
Steagall Act. U.S. House Banking Committee Chairman Jim

Leach introduced the Financial Services Competitiveness Act

20

of 1995 in the Congress that would repeal Section 20 of the

Glass-Steagall Act and would create

a

new Section of the

Bank Holding Company Act to authorize an adequately

capitalized bank holding company to own

a

securities

affiliate engaged in the dealing and underwriting of
securities 62

.

It would also permit a securities firm to

acquire banks by becoming a bank holding company or to

become an "investment bank holding company" (IBHC) and to
acquire a "wholesale financial institution", an institution

taking uninsured deposits of $100,000 or more 63

E.

.

CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION

The efficient performing of financial markets requires

that members of the financial community have confidence in

each other's ability to transact business. This premise

means that each member of the financial community must
have,

among other things, adequate capital. In general,

capital standards are designed to protect customers and to
ensure a viable financial system by diminishing the chance
of a series of interrelated defaults because of risks in

securities markets 64

.

The purpose of capital adequacy rules

is to protect against excessive riskiness in banking 65

bank's capital

-

.

A

that is roughly speaking the excess of its

assets over its liabilities

-

is its cushion against

21

insolvency 66

.

Capital adequacy regulation requires that

banks maintain sufficient levels of capital against their
assets. There are a variety of bases for mandating minimum

capital. First,

capital may be utilized to provide a

cushion against future losses 67

.

Further,

the greater a

bank's equity, the smaller the cost to the FDIC in a

liquidation proceeding 68

.

Also, minimum capital

requirements may be used to curb potentially risky or

unprofitable interstate and product expansion 69 There are
.

currently two separate capital adequacy rules for banks:
-1. Leverage ratios

:

this is simply a gross ratio of

capital to assets without any adjustment for risk 70

.

It

does not take into account the Risk Profile of the bank.
For example, Capital/assets equals 3% for high rated

institutions and with higher ratios for lower rated

institutions 71

.

This method became problematic because of

international competition.
-2. Risk adjusted capital ratios that stems from the Basle

Agreement in 1988 72

.

The underlying rationale behind the

use of a risk-based capital approach is based on a system

assigning assets and off-balance sheet items, such as
derivatives, to risk categories. The Capital Adequacy rules

establish minimum ratios of capital to weighted risk
assets, but banks and bank holding companies are generally

expected to operate well above the minimum risk-based

22

ratios at

a

level corresponding to the degree of risk to

which they are exposed 73

.

Banks must hold capital against

counterparty credit risks exposures, including the credit
risk exposure from their derivative activities. In light of

these considerations the banking regulatory agencies expect
that banking organizations will, as a general matter,

operate with capital levels well above the minimum risk-

based levels 74

F.

.

THE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM

-

ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Banking institutions are among the most closely

scrutinized businesses in the United States 75

.

In order to

prevent banks from engaging in illegal behavior or unsound

practices and to maintain public confidence in the
integrity of the banking system, banks are subjected to
vigorous and ever-increasing regulatory review 76

Reserve bank regulators have access to

a

.

Federal

broad range of

sanctions. Banks are required to report massive amounts of

information to their respective supervisory agencies. They
must disclose the results of their operations, the shape of

their balance sheets, the general makeup of their assets,
their capital structure and much more 77

.

The most intimate

details of their operations are subject to probing analysis

by bank examiners whose sole responsibility is to detect
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illegality and unsafe practices 78

If the regulators become

.

convinced that an institution is engaged in illegal

behavior or unsound practices, they may threaten

a

cease-

and-desist action against the institution or its officers
and directors 79

.

The officers and directors may be sued for

civil damages and they may even be removed

-

fired

-

from

the institution and barred from all federally insured

institutions 80

.

For example,

an agency may issue an order

against a bank officer who has violated any law, regulation
or order, participated in "unsafe or unsound practice," or

breached a fiduciary duty, and, as a result of any such
actions, has caused or may cause an institution to suffer a

financial loss, may prejudice the interest of depositors,
or has realized a pecuniary gain 81

.

The institution itself

may suffer onerous penalties, including suspension or
termination of Federal Reserve deposit insurance 82

.

The

most important enforcement procedures are: informal
agreements and conditions; cease-and-desist orders;

suspension or removal of bank officers; civil monetary
penalties; suspension or termination of Federal Reserve

deposit insurance; civil litigation and criminal

prosecutions 83

.

As a general rule, courts defer to the

enforcement actions of Federal Reserve banking agencies 84

.

The agencies enjoy very broad powers to impose sanctions.
The examination process can help prevent problem situations
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from remaining uncorrected and deteriorating to the point

where costly financial assistance by the FDIC becomes

unavoidable 85

.

Also,

the examination supplies the

supervisor with an understanding of the nature, relative
seriousness and ultimate cause of bank's problems, and thus

provides a factual foundation to soundly base correctives
measures, recommendations and instructions 86

.

One would

suspect that given these impressive powers, the supervision

system would be remarkably effective at preventing unsound
practices. As will be noted in the next chapters, the

staggering losses incurred by the banking industry during
the last five years due to the use of derivatives could

probably have been avoided in every instance had the
institution in question been prevented from further trading
in those volatile products or been required to stop trading

these instruments prior to or to the point of economic

insolvency. Why does the system not work as it should? What

accounts for the apparent regulatory inefficiency? First,
it may well be that bank examiners do not possess a fully

adequate methodology for assessing the safety and soundness
of the financial institutions they supervise 87

,

especially

those heavily engaged in derivatives trade. Furthermore,

bank examinations may have become less effective as

a

result of profound structural changes in the banking and
finance industry 88

.

As some institutions have become
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nationwide and even worldwide in scope, conducting broad
range of complex activities such as derivatives,

getting more difficult for the agencies to reveal

it is
a

full

and accurate picture of the institution's overall financial

status 89

.

It is virtually impossible to conduct a reliable

audit at the bank from a single location and by the time
you have gathered all relevant information in order to

assess the institution'

s

current condition and make

judgments about compliances,

it might be that the

information is already outdated or at least does not
reflect accurately the financial status of the institution.

Even consolidation records of a bank cannot be fully up to
date because derivative positions change all the time and

balance sheets do not give

a

proper picture of what is

going on. For anyone on the outside to keep track is

virtually impossible. Additionally, it is even more
difficult to monitor and supervise an industry in crisis.

CHAPTER III:

DEFINITION

-

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS

A.

THE DEFINITION OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS

1.

Introduction

It might be worthwhile to introduce this subchapter by

giving first an illustration of one kind of investment

strategy that characterize the dynamics associated with
some kind of derivative instruments. Let us take the

property owner with a mortgage as an example. A person buys
a

house for $100,000; he or she puts up $10,000 and borrows

$90,000 from the bank. He or she has no intention to live
in that house nor would he or she be the owner. His or her

intention is to sell the house at the most appropriate
time. Six months later,

the house is sold for $150,000. He

or she pays back $90,000 to the bank

(for our purpose we

ignore interest payments) and keeps $60,000 which seems not
too bad for an original investment of just $10,000. As will

be noted in the course of subsequent chapters, the

principle is exactly the same in many derivative
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investments: leverage or the use of debt to magnify

investement returns.

2.

Definition

:

What Are Derivatives?

The usual textbook definition given for derivatives is

something like "instruments derived from securities or

physical markets." 90

The problem is that the term

"derivatives' has become a catch-all generic term that has
7

been used to include all types of new (and some old)
financial instruments. The most common types of derivatives
that investors are likely to come across are futures,
options,

forwards,

swaps, warrants and convertible bonds.

Beyond this, the derivative range is only limited by
the imagination of investment bankers and it is likely that

any person who has funds invested or placed in an insurance

policy or pension fund, is already, wittingly or
unwittingly, involved in derivative activities 91
specifically,

.

More

financial derivatives are defined as

"financial instruments which derive their value from the

performance of assets, interest or currency exchange rates,
or indexes." 92 Derivative transactions include a wide

assortment of financial contracts, including structured
debt obligations, deposits, swaps,
floors,

collars,

futures, options,

caps,

forwards, and various combinations

thereof." 93 They are widely used to speculate on future
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expectations or to reduce

a

security portfolio's risk.

Despite the variety and complexity of these instruments,
all derivatives basically require two parties to take

opposite positions as to the future value of the underlying
asset. One party to the contract assumes the risk that the

underlying asset will increase in value while the other

party assumes the risk of a decrease in value. The
underlying asset can be anything from stocks to interest
rates 94

.

There are also derivative instruments involving

commodities and precious metals and the range of terms and
conditions attached to derivative contracts are as broad as
the imagination of the contracting parties. Finally,

derivatives should not be confused with shares. The subtle,
but crucial, difference lies in the fact that, while shares
are assets, derivatives are usually contracts

(the major

exception to this are warrants and convertible bonds, which
are similar to shares in that they are assets)

assets

(e.g.

shares, bonds)

.

Financial

can be defined as claims on

another person or corporation; they will usually be fairly

standardized and governed by the property or securities
laws in an given jurisdiction. On the other hand, a

contract is merely an agreement between two parties, where
the contract details may not be standardized. Possibly

because it is thought that investors may be wary of the

woolly definition of derivatives, one frequently comes
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across references to "derivatives securities" "derivatives

products". These "securities" and "products" sound fairly

tangible things. But in many cases these terms are

solid,

rather inappropriately applied to what are really
contracts.

B.

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF DERIVATIVES

1.

The Development of Derivative Markets

The derivative markets have a long pedigree.

Historians have traced transactions in derivative
instruments to 2000 B.C. 95 In the U.S., is was not until
the middle of the eighteenth century that a fully

functioning futures market was established in Chicago 96

.

Chicago was rapidly becoming the transportation and

distribution center of the Midwest. Farmers shipped their
grain from the farm belt to Chicago for sale and subsequent

distribution eastward along rail lines and the Great
Lakes 97

.

However, due to the seasonal nature of grain

production, large quantities of grain were shipped to

Chicago in the later summer and fall 98

.

The city's storage

facilities were inadequate for accommodating this temporary

increase in supply. Prices fell drastically at harvest time
as supplies increased and then,

were consumed 99

.

In 1848,

a

rose steadily as supplies

group of businessmen took the
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first step toward alleviating this problem by forming the

Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)

100
.

The CBOT initially was

organized for the purpose of standardizing the quantities
and qualities of the grains 101

.

A few years later, the first forward contract was
developed. Called
a farmer

a

"to-arrive" contract, it provided that

could agree to deliver the grain at a future date

at a price determined in advance 102

.

This meant that the

farmer would not ship the grain to Chicago at harvest time
but could fix the price and date at which the grain

subsequently would be sold 103

.

Speculators soon found that

rather than buy and sell the grain itself they could buy
and sell the contracts 104

.

In that way,

they could speculate

on the price of grain to be delivered at a future date and
not have to worry about taking delivery of and storing the

grain 105

.

Soon thereafter, the exchange established a set of

rules and regulations for governing these transactions. In
1874,

the Chicago Produce Exchange was formed and in 1898

it was reorganized as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,

which is now the world's second largest futures exchange 106
One of the America's first financial scandals, involved

futures trading in securities 107

.

William Duer, a prominent

financier and Revolutionary War figure, was bankrupted in
1792 after he engaged in massive speculations in the debt

of the United States and stock of the Bank of the United

.
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States and the Bank of New York 108

.

He and an accomplice,

Alexander Macomb, entered into contracts for the future
delivery of those securities, which triggered
frenzy 109

The speculation eventually failed,

.

America's first financial panic 110

.

a

speculative

resulting in

Trading in "privileges",

"puts and calls", and "price differences" also accompanied
the speculation during the Civil war 111

.

For a fee,

the

purchaser was given the "privilege" or option to buy or
sell grain a a specified price 112

.

In 1865,

the Board of

Trade prohibited such transactions because they were viewed
to be gambling contracts but that bar was ineffective in

stopping such trading as were later the efforts of the
exchange 113

.

Difference trading on price changes also became

commonplace in the over-the-counter market and again the
states attempted to stop this trading through legislation
that prohibited such contracts or made them unenforceable
as gambling contracts 114

.

The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936

prohibited domestic futures transactions that did not take
place on

a

licensed contract market such as the Chicago

Board of Trade 115

.

By the early 1970s, however, there were

numerous unregulated exchanges that were trading futures
contracts on several commodities including precious metals,
currencies, and the so-called "world" commodities, e.g.,
coffee,

sugar,

and cocoa 116

.

Another more serious flaw in

the Commodity Exchange Act involved its prohibition against
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commodity options trading, which had been banned because of
the many abuses associated with those instruments 117

.

The

same gap in the Commodity Exchange Act that allowed some

futures exchanges to operate in an unregulated environment
also allowed options trading on such commdities leading to

millions of dollars in customer losses 118

.

Congress reacted

to these problems by enacting new legislation,

the

Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 119 (CFTCA) of 1974,

which created

a

commission similar to the Securities and

Exchange Commission and this commission was given expanded

regulatory powers and enforcement sanctions 120

.

The new act

subjected all commodities of whatever kind to regulation
under the Commodity Exchange Act 121

.

The new Commission,

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)

,

was also given

plenary authority to regulate commodity options 122
the 1980s,

the

.

Before

generally speaking, bank uses of derivatives

were expected to be limited to the management of interest
rate and exchange rate risks associated with banking

operations, and were limited to instruments where the

underlying asset was an asset that was permissible for
direct purchase by the depository-institution 123

.

During the

course of the 1980s, however, the nature and extent of
financial institution participation in the derivative

markets changed dramatically. Banks became increasingly
involved in trading activities that were not necessarily
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related to the management of risk, and expanded the
purchase and sale of products to include instruments where
the underlying asset was not necessarily one that the

financial institution could buy or sell 124

.

In addition,

the

explosive growth of the swap markets contributed

significantly to bank involvement in the OTC derivative
markets, as financial institutions discovered that their

ability to control interest rate, exchange rate and other
risks associated with their general banking activities was

significantly enhanced by the ability to exchange (or swap)
cash flows and payment streams 125

.

As more new derivative

products, such as swaps and certain interest rate
contracts, began to multiply, at the same time, confusion

grew as to whether this new products had to be regulated by
the CFTC. Recognizing the uncertainty that lay in the area
of these developing derivative financial instruments,

Congress enacted the Futures Trading Practices Act of
1992 126

.

That legislation amended the Commodity Exchange Act

to provide the CFTC with some exemptive power for

institutional traders 127

.

This was needed, not only to

remove the legal uncertainties of swaps and over-the-

counter derivatives, but also because the derivative

products traded by institutions were individually

negotiated and would not fit within the standardized format
required for exchange trading 128

.

The Futures Trading
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Practices Act of 1992 allowed the CFTC to exempt any

transaction by "appropriate persons" from the exchange
trading requirement 129

.

Appropriate persons include

institutional participants such as banks, insurance
companies,
dealers,

investment companies, commodity pools, broker-

corporations of a specific size and "other

persons." 130

.

The CFTC has adopted regulations to implement

that legislation by,

among other things, exempting swaps

transactions by institutions 131

2.

.

The Development of Financial Futures

For the first 120 years,

futures exchanges offered

trading in contracts on commodities such as agricultural
goods and metals 132

Then,

.

in 1971,

the major Western

economies began to allow their currency exchanges rates to
fluctuate and this opened the way for the formation in 1972
of the International Monetary Market

(IMM)

,

a

subsidiary of

the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that specializes in the

trading of futures contracts on foreign currencies 133

.

These

were the first futures contracts that could be called
financial futures 134

.

In 1976,

the International Monetary

Market introduced the first futures contract on

a

government security and short-term financial instrument:
the 90 day U.S. Treasury bills 135

.

This contract was

actively traded for many years, but its popularity has
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declined somewhat, at least partly due to the remarkable
success of a competing contract, the Eurodollar futures,

which was launched in 1981 136

.

In 1977,

the Chicago Board of

Trade started what became the most successful contract of
the U.S. Treasury bond futures 137

all time:

.

The 1980s

brought the highly successful stock index futures
contract 138

.

The ensuing years saw a tremendous degree of

competition between the futures exchanges to introduce new
contracts that would generate significant trading volume 139

Barely

a

.

month passed without at least one new futures

contract being introduced 140

.

Today financial futures and

options markets span over the globe. The underlying asset

may be

a

deposit in a major currency, a bond issued by a

major government, equity in a firm or an index in

a

leading

stock.

The Growth of Derivative Markets and The

3.

Integration of Fin ancial Markets

An important phenomenon of recent years has been the
tremendous growth in international markets 141

.

Fueled by

advances in communications technology and the breakdown of
communism, we have seen economic systems change and new

financial markets develop in nearly all countries of the

world 142

.

Indeed, Eastern Europe develops its market

economies, Western Europe moves toward a unified economic
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system and Japan already represents an enormous economic
and financial power. The continued growth of large

multinational corporations and financial institutions, has
brought down barriers among countries, making it much
easier to trade financial assets across country lines 143

.

This phenomenon whereby markets in various countries

behave in a competitive and unified manner is called

international market integration 144 or the globalization of
financial markets. Three factors have led to this
integration. First, the deregulation of markets in key

financial centers of the world has played an important
role 145

.

Global competition has forced governments to

deregulate various aspects of their financial markets so
that their financial enterprises can compete effectively

around the world 146

Second,

.

technological advances for

monitoring world markets, executing orders and analyzing
financial opportunities have brought radical changes in the
financial markets 147

.

Advances in telecommunications systems, such as
Internet or America Online,

link market participants

throughout the world with the result that an order can be

executed within seconds. Further, advances in computer
technology along with advanced telecomunication networks
allow the transmission of real-time information on security
prices and other key information to many participants in
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many places 146

As a result, many investors can monitor

.

global markets and simultaneously assess how this

information will effect the risk/return profile of their

portfolios 149
Third,

.

the US financial markets have shifted from

domination by retail investors to domination by financial
institutions 150

.

The shifting from dominance by retail

investors to institutional investors is referred to as the

institutionalization of financial markets 151

.

Retail

investors mean individuals. For example, when you and
a

buy

I

share of common stock, we are retail investors. Examples

of financial institutions are pension funds,

companies, commercial banks,

insurances

savings and loans

associations. As a result, unlike the retail investor,

institutional investors have been more willing to transfer
funds across national borders to improve portfolio

diversification and/or take advantage of perceived

mispricing of financial assets in foreign countries 152

.

This

new environment creates challenges and opportunities for
today'

s

financial and investment managers but also entails

new threats. As will be examined in next chapters, this

integration of markets involves enhanced risk, especially
the so-called systemic risk

(see infra)

.

Indeed,

there has

been a fear expressed by certain regulators and
commentators that the failure of

a

major derivatives
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participant could send shock waves throughout the financial
system as a whole. This is referred to as the "ripple
effect". This new threat of single systemic risk has been

raised by some like a banner in the battle for more laws
and more regulation. Anyway, thanks to the dismantling of

regulatory barriers and improvement in the infrastructure
of financial markets,

investors have gained access to a

wider range of products 153

.

Derivatives have heightened that

trend. Because transaction costs are lower and derivatives

are often more actively traded than conventional

instruments,

it is easier for example,

to switch from

German to the Japanese stock market by using futures rather
then by selling a portfolio of individual stocks 154

.

Derivatives have created much greater linkage between

markets and the leverage involved means that positions can
turn much quicker 155

.

For in the last ten years,

the ties

that have been binding the financial world closer together

have themselves become more complex. For example,

futures

trading takes place on 11 futures exchanges in the United
States and on an electronic system called GLOBEX 156

.

Today,

almost every large country (and even a few small ones 157

)

has a futures exchange. One benefit of such global futures
trading, particularly when it is fully automated,

is the

potential it offers for linkages among exchanges 158

.

example,

For

the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Singapore
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International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX)
a

are linked so that

trader opening a position in Eurodollars or certain

foreign currencies on one exchange can close the position
on the other 159

.

The trading of futures on foreign products

and the opportunities to open a contract in one market and

offset it in another move the markets toward near 24-hour

trading 160

play

a

.

Derivative instruments play and will continue to

critical role in global financial markets. The

unprecedented expansion in the use of derivatives can be
seen as the business world'

s

response to the financial

risks posed by increasingly globalized financial markets 161

Without derivative instruments and the markets in which
they trade, the financial systems throughout the world

would not be as integrated as they are today 162

.

.

CHAPTER IV:
WHO USES DERIVATIVES AND WHY

-

THE PURPOSE AND ROLE OF DERIVATIVES

A.

PARTICIPANTS IN DERIVATIVES

The participants in derivatives can be divided into
two groups: end-users and dealers. End-users are firms

engaged primarily in industrial or commercial enterprises
(for example,

investment management firms, energy concerns,

export/import companies, corporations, governmental
institutional investors, and financial

entities,

institutions 163

.

Dealers consist mainly of banks and

securities firms with a few insurances companies and highly
(mainly energy firms) having recently

rated corporations

joined the ranks 164

.

An institution may participate in

derivatives activity both as an end-user and
example,

a

a dealer.

For

money-center bank acts as an end-user when it

uses derivatives to take positions as part of its

proprietary trading or for hedging as part of its asset and
liability management 165

.

It acts as a dealer when it quotes

bids and offers and commits capital to satisfying
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customers' demands for derivatives 166

.

Banks earn revenues

from derivative activities through "transaction fees, bid-

offer spreads, and their own trading positions." 167 Banks

may also earn fees by offering customers risk management
tools through the use of financial derivatives 168

.

In

addition, banks may use financial derivatives to lower

their cost of funding and to reduce undesirable exposure to

interest rate changes or currency fluctuations 169

.

Banks

control approximately seventy percent of the off-exchange

derivative activities 170

.

Although National Banks have been

authorized for several years to engage in financial
derivative activities 171

,

with exception of New York 172

,

there appears to be little published guidance for State
Banks. Ten banks, or their affiliates, accounted for

approximately ninety percent of bank derivative activity
with respect to interest rate contracts as of September
1992 173

.

Six of these ten banks were National Banks,

remaining four were New York State Banks 174

B.

and the

.

THE PURPOSE OF DERIVATIVES

Derivative contracts provide issuers and investors an
inexpensive way of controlling some major risks 175 (see
infra)

.

The primary risks are associated with unpredictable

(volatile) movements in foreign exchange and interest
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as well as in the prices of equities and

rates,

commodities 176

.

The four examples below illustrate the needs

for using derivative transactions in the business and

financial world.
1.

Suppose that a particular company

Prudential Investor

-

-

we call it the

plans to obtain a bank loan for $100

million two months from now. The key risk here is that two
months from now the interest rate will be higher than it is
If the interest rate is only one percent higher,

today.

Prudential Investor would have to pay $1 million more in
annual interest. So clearly,

issuers/borrowers need a way

to protect against the rise in interest rates.
2.

a

Presume that Prudential Investor Pension Fund owns

portfolio consisting of common stock of

a

large number of

companies. In order to fulfill its obligations the pension
fund must make periodic payments to the beneficiaries of
the plan. Suppose the pension fund knows that two months

from now it must sell stock in its portfolio to pay off

beneficiaries $20 million. The risk that Prudential Pension
Fund faces is that two months from now when the stocks are
sold,

the price of most or all stocks may be lower than

they are today. If, indeed, stock prices do decline, the

pension fund will have to sell off more shares to realize
$20 million. Thus,

investors such as the Prudential Fund,

may want to protect against this kind of risk. The pension
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fund managers can hedge by selling in the futures markets

and lock in a selling price.
3.

Suppose that another company the Prudential Trust

plans to issue a bond in Switzerland and the periodic

payments that the company must make to the bondholders are

denominated in the Swiss Currency, the franc. The amount of
U.S. dollars that Prudential Trust must pay to receive the

amount of Swiss francs it has contracted to pay depends

upon the exchange rate at the time the payment must be
made. For example,

suppose that at the time Prudential

Trust plans to issue the bonds, the exchange rate is such
that one U.S. dollar is equal to 1.5 Swiss francs. So,

for

each 7.5 million Swiss francs that Prudential must pay to
the bondholders,

it must pay $5 million.

If at any time

that a payment must be made in Swiss francs, the value of
the U.S. dollar declines to the Swiss franc,

Prudential

Trust will have to pay more U.S. dollars to satisfy its

contractual obligation. If, for example, one U.S. dollar at
the time of a payment changes to 1.25 Swiss francs,

Prudential would have to pay

$

6

million to make a payment

of 7.5 million Swiss francs. This is $1 million more than

when it issued the bonds. All Issuers/borrowers who raise
funds in currency that is not their local currency face
this kind of risk. To illustrate another example, consider
an ordinary commodities future contract for gold selling at
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$400 per ounce. Party A believes the price of gold will

rise while party B believes the price of gold will fall. A

and B might enter into a contract in which A will buy from
B,

and B will sell to A,

100 ounces of gold at $400 per

ounce on a specified date in the future ("expiration
date")

.

If the price of gold falls to $380 per ounce on the

expiration date, B can buy gold at the market price and
sell it to

A

at a profit of $20 an ounce. Hence,

have bought the gold at $2

A will

per ounce more than the spot

market price at the expiration date. If, however, the price
of gold rises to $420 per ounce, A can buy gold from B at

$400 per ounce and sell it at the market price for a profit
of $20 per ounce. So,

derivatives permit end-users and

dealers to identify, isolate, and manage separately the
fundamental risks and other characteristics that are bound

together in traditional financial instruments 177

.

Derivatives are a means by which elements of risk can be
stripped away from

a

transaction, providing the user with

cost effective protection from the market volatility 178

.

Desired combinations of cash flow, interest rate, currency,
liquidity, and market source characteristics can be

achieved largely by separate choices, each independent of
the underlying cash market instrument 179

.

As a result,

management is able to think and act in terms of fundamental
risks. Derivatives are used by thousands of entities
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worldwide, typically in the pursuit of one or more of the
three following goals 180
costs,

and

(3)

:

(1)

speculation.

hedging,

(2)

reducing funding

CHAPTER V:
TYPES OF DERIVATIVE INTRUMENTS AND KEY FEATURES

A.

FUTURES MARKETS

1.

Definition

A future contract is

a

legal agreement between a buyer

and a seller in which:
-

the buyer agrees to take delivery of something at a

specified price at the end of
-

a

designated period of time;

the seller agrees to make delivery of something at a

specified price at the end of
time 181

.

a

designated period of

Of course, no one buys or sells anything when

entering into

futures contract. Rather, the parties to

a

the contract agree to buy or sell a specific amount of a

specific item at a specified future date 182

.

Let us consider

the key elements of this contract. The price at which

parties agree to transact in the future is called the
futures price 183

.

The designated date at which the parties

must transact is called the settlement date or delivery
date 184

.

The "something" that the parties agree to exchange

is called the underlying 185

.

The buyer of a futures
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contract, who has the obligation to buy the good at the

later date, can sell the contract in the futures market,

which relieves him or her of the obligation to purchase the
good 186

.

Likewise, the seller of the futures contract, who

is obligated to sell the good at a later date,

can buy the

contract back in the futures market, relieving him or her
of the obligation to sell the good 187

2.

Illustration

:

.

A Simple Numerical Example

Assume that there is

a

futures contract traded on an

exchange where the underlying asset to be bought or sold is
asset ABC and the settlement date is three months from now.

Assume further that party one called Bruce buys this future
contracts and that party two called Sally sells this
futures contract and that the price at which they agree to

transact in the future is $100. $100 is the futures price.
So,

at the settlement date Sally will deliver asset ABC to

Bruce and Bruce will give Sally $100 the futures price.
Suppose that one month after the deal, the futures price
the asset increases to $120; Bruce - the buyer - of the

futures contract, could then sell the futures contract and

realize a profit of $20. Indeed, he has agreed to buy, at
the settlement date asset ABC for $100 but it is worth
$120.

Suppose that the future price falls to $40, Sally

realizes a profit of $60 because she agreed to sell asset
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ABC for $100 and now can buy it on the market for $40. In
this case, Bruce would realize a loss of $60. Thus,

if the

futures price decreases the buyer of the futures contract

realizes a loss while the seller of the future contract
realizes a profit 188

.

When an investor takes

,

position in

(or agreeing to buy

the market by buying a futures contract
at the future date)

a

the investor is said to be in a long

position or to be long futures 189

.

Conversely, if the

opening position is the sale of

futures

investor'

s

contract

(which means the contractual obligation to sell

something in the future)

,

the investor is said to be in a

short position or to be short futures 190

3.

a

.

Creatio n of a Futures Contract

Futures contracts are products created by exchanges 191
To create a particular future contract,

.

an exchange must

obtain approval from the Commodity Futures Trading

Commission 192

.

In its application to the CFTC,

the exchange

must demonstrate that there is an economic purpose for that
contract 193

.

While numerous futures contracts obtain

approval for trading, only those contracts that spark

investor interest and serve investor needs ultimately

succeed 194

.

The basic economic function of the future

markets is to provide an opportunity for market

participants to hedge against the risk of adverse price
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movements. In the United States, the development of the

markets for futures and options on stock indexes and debt
obligations was

a

response to the need for an efficient

risk-transference mechanism as stock price and interest
rate volatility in the United States increased 195
1972,

.

Prior to

only futures contracts involving traditional

agricultural commodities (such as grain and livestock),
imported foodstuffs (such as coffee, cocoa and sugar) or
industrial commodities were traded 196

.

Collectively, such

contracts are known as commodities futures. Futures
contracts based on financial instruments or financial index
are known as financial futures 197

4.

Liquidating

a

.

Position

Most financial futures contracts have settlements
dates in March, June, September or December 198
that,

at a predetermined time,

.

This means

the contract settlement

month, the contract stops trading and a price is determined

by the exchange for settlement 199

.

A party to

a futures

contract has two choices on liquidation of the position.
First,

the position can be liquidated prior to the

settlement date: the party must take an offsetting position
in the same contract 200

.

For the buyer of a futures

contract, this means selling the same number of identical

futures contracts; for the seller of a futures contract,
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this means buying the same number of identical futures

contracts 201

.

Second,

the alternative is to wait until the

settlement date: at that time, the purchaser of a futures
contract accepts delivery of the asset; the party that
sells a futures contract liquidates the position by

delivering the underlying asset at the agreed upon price 202

5.

.

The Role of the Clearinghouse

Associated with every futures exchange is

a

clearinghouse, which performs several functions. One

function is to guarantee that the two parties to the

transaction will perform 203

.

For each transaction,

obviously, there is a buyer, usually called the long, and a

seller called the short 204

.

In the absence of the

clearinghouse, each party would be responsible to the
other. If one party defaults,
a

the other would be left with

worthless claim. The clearinghouse exists to meet this

problem. When someone takes a position in the futures

market the clearinghouse takes the opposite position and
agrees to satisfy the terms set forth in the contract 205

.

The clearinghouse interposes itself as the buyer for

every sale and the seller for every purchase 206

.

So,

the two

parties are then free to liquidate their positions without
involving the other party in the original contract, and
without worry that the other party may default 207

.

This is

s
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called the guarantee function of the clearinghouse.
the clearinghouse makes it simple for the parties

Besides,

to a futures contract to unwind their positions prior to

the settlement date 208

.

Suppose that one party wants to get

out of his futures position. He or she will not have to

seek out the other party and work out an agreement with him
or her to terminate the original agreement. Instead, he or
she can unwind his or her position by selling an identical

futures contract 209

.

At the settlement date, the seller will

not deliver the asset to the original buyer but will be

instructed by the clearinghouse to deliver to someone who
bought and still has an open futures position 210

.

In the

case of options contracts the Clearinghouse is known as the

Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) which is also an

independent corporation that guarantees the writer'

performance 211

6.

.

Margin Requirements

When

a

position is first taken in a futures contract,

the investor must deposit a minimum dollar amount per

contract as specified by the exchange 212

called initial margin, is required as
contract 213

a

.

This amount,

deposit for the

.

At the end of each trading day, the exchange

determines the "settlement price" for the futures
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contract 214

.

The exchange uses the settlement price to mark

to market the investor' s position,

so that any gain or loss

from the position is quickly reflected in the investor's

equity account 215

.

Additionally, we have the maintenance margin which is
the minimum level to which an investor's equity position

may fall as

a

result of an unfavorable price movement

before the investor is requirement to deposit additional

margin 216

.

The additional margin deposited is called variation

margin, and it is the amount necessary to bring the equity
in the account back to its initial margin level 217

party to

a

.

If a

futures contract who is required to deposit

variation margin fails to do so within 24 hours, the
exchange closes the futures position out 218
the Mark-To-Market procedure,

.

To illustrate

let us assume the following

requirements for asset ABC: Initial margin $7 per contract
and maintenance margin $4 per contract. Let us assume that

Bruce buys 500 contracts at futures prices of $100 and
Sandra sells the same number of contracts at the same
price. Initial margin for Bruce and Sandra is $3,500 which
is determined by multiplying the initial margin of $7 by

numbers of contracts which is 500. Bruce and Sandra must
put up $3,500 in cash. The maintenance margin for the

positions is $2,000 (500 x

4)

2

which means that the equity
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in the account may not fall below $2,000.

If it does,

the

party whose equity falls below the maintenance margin must
put up additional margins 219

.

When the investor decide to

trade futures, he has to make daily cash payments to the

stock exchange in the event the trades go against him220

.

These cash payments are called "variation margin

payments" or

"

market-to-market payments. //221 Each day the

Stock Exchange makes a running calculation on the value of
the futures the trader has bought or sold and if the

current price has moved too far away from his traded price,
the dealer has to pay up and the cash he pays is passed on

by the stock exchange to the clearinghouses 222
if the price goes with the trader,

.

Conversely,

he will receive cash

payments via the stock exchange. The Stock Exchange thus
works as a transparent financial house which matches all
the buyers and sellers and passes the money back and forth

each day. The reason for these payments is to avoid

problems being caused to the market or to other users by
anyone defaulting on their contractual obligations 223

.

Futures and options are so volatile that if no payments

were made until they expired, the loser could face an

enormous liability and end up collapsing without being able
to fulfill his obligations. This,

in turn,

could lead to a

domino sequence where all the brokers collapse. By

demanding payment each day the Stock Exchange ensures that
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everybody in the market knows exactly what their position
is.

7.

The Leveraging Aspect of the Futures

One major aspect of derivatives is that,

for a small

down payment, the purchaser can control a larger portion of
the market. For example,

$10,000 could buy a contract to

purchase $100,000 worth of bonds later. Such leverage means
potential gains or losses are magnified. A party taking a

position in a futures contract need not to put up the
entire amount of the investment. Instead, the exchange or

clearinghouse requires only the initial margin to be put
up.

To see the crucial consequences of this aspect,

suppose

Bruce has $100 and wants to invest in asset ABC because he

believes its price will increase. If asset ABC is selling
for 100 he can buy one unit of the asset. His payoff will
be based on the price action of one unit asset ABC. Suppose

further that the exchange where the futures contract for
asset ABC is traded requires an initial margin of only 5%

which in this case would be $5. This means that Bruce can

buy 20 contracts with his $100 investment. His payoff will
then depend on the price action of 20 unites of asset ABC.
Thus, he can leverage the use of his funds.
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8.

Daily Price Limits

The exchange has the right to impose a limit on the

daily price movement of a futures contract from the
previous day's closing price 224

.

A daily price limit sets

the minimum and maximum price at which the futures contract

may trade that day 225

.

The rationale offered for the

imposition of this rule is that it provides stability to
the market at times when new information may cause the

futures price to exhibit extreme fluctuations and
stability,

market 226

9.

in turn, puts

greater confidence in the

.

Futures versus Forward Contracts

A forward contract, just like

a futures contract,

is

an agreement for the future delivery of something at a

specified price at the end of
time 227

.

designated period of

Forward contracts, sometimes called forward

commitments 228
example,

a

,

are very common in everyday life 229

.

For

an apartment lease is a series of forward

contracts 230

.

The current month's use of the apartment is a

spot transaction, but the two parties also have agreed to

usage of the apartment for future months at a rent agreed

upon today. A forward contract is usually nonstandardized

because the terms of each contract are negotiated

individually between the buyer and seller 231

.

Unlike futures
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contract, which is an exchanged-traded product,

contract is an over-the-counter instrument 232

(

a

forward

see infra).

Although both futures and forward contracts set forth
terms of delivery,

futures contracts are not intended to be

settled by delivery 233

.

intended for delivery234

Forward contracts, in contrast, are

Most of what we say about futures

.

contracts applies equally to forward contracts.

10.

The Role of Futures in Financial Markets and

Applicatio ns of Futures Contracts
a.

The Role of Futures Markets

Without financial futures, investors would have only
one trading location to alter portfolio positions when they
get new information that is expected to influence the value
of the assets: the cash market 235

.

If investors hear

economic news that is expected to impact the value of an
asset adversely, they want to reduce their price risk

exposure to that asset 236

.

The opposite would be true if the

new information is expected to impact the value of an asset
favorably; an investor would increase price risk exposure
to that asset 237

.

There are, of course, transactions costs

associated with altering exposure to an asset: explicit
costs

(commissions), execution costs 238

.

The futures markets

is an alternative market that investors can use to alter

their risk exposure to an asset when new information is
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acquired 239

.

But which market

-

cash or futures- should the

investor employ to alter a position quickly on the receipt
of new information

?

The answer is simple: the one that

most efficiently achieves the objective. The factors to
consider are liquidity, transactions costs, taxes, and
leverages advantages of the futures contracts 240

.

Financial

futures are traded to either speculate on prices of

securities for example, or hedge (i.e., a transaction in

which an investor seeks to protect

a

position or

anticipated position in the spot market by using an
opposite position in derivatives) existing exposure to

security price movements. The speculators in financial
futures markets take positions to profit from expected

changes in price of futures contracts over time. Other

participants, hedgers, take positions to reduce their

exposure to future movements in interest rates or stock
prices. The key role of futures contracts is that,

in a

well functioning futures market, these contracts provide a

more efficient means for investors to alter their risk
exposure to an asset. Futures contract present benefits:
liquidity, transaction costs, taxes and leverage. The major

function of futures markets is to transfer price risk from
hedgers to speculators 241

,

i.e,

risk is transferred from

those willing to pay to avoid risk to those wanting to

assume risk in the hope of gain.
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a.l)

Hedging

The term "hedging" refers to the risk management

activities investors engage in to reduce their exposure to

unpredictable changes in the market 242

.

Used as

a

risk

management tool, derivatives allow end-users to reduce
inherent market risks, creating a more stable and

predictable cash flow that is insulated from market
swings 243

provide

.

This goal is attainable because derivatives

a

means by which end-users can shift the risks

presented by market fluctuations to
to bear such risks 244

.

a

player who is willing

The term short hedge and long hedge

distinguish hedges that involve short and long positions in
the futures contract, respectively 245

.

For example,

hedger

a

who holds the commodity and is concerned about a decrease
in its price might consider hedging it with a short

position. If the spot price decreases, the futures price
also will decrease. As the hedger is short the futures
contract, the futures transaction produces a profit that at

least partially offsets the loss on the spot position.

Hedging is the employment of a futures transaction as a

temporary substitute for
market 246

.

a

transaction in the cash

As long as cash and futures prices move together,

any loss realized on one position (whether cash or futures)

will be offset by a profit on the other position 247

.

When

the profit and loss are equal, the hedge is called a
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perfect hedge 248

.

In a market where the futures contract is

correctly priced,
therefore,

rate 249

perfect hedge is risk-free and,

a

should provide

a

return equal to the risk-free

.

a. 2)

Why Do Firms Hedge?

Assuming that shareholders of

a

company cannot assess

all of the financial risks themselves,

hedging may be

desired by the shareholders simply because they want to
find a more acceptable combination of risk and return 250

.

In

addition there may be other reasons why firms hedge, such
as tax advantages 251

Low-income firms,

.

for example those

who are below the highest coporate tax rate, can

particularly benefit from the interaction between hedging
and the progressive corporate income tax structure 252

.

Hedging also reduces the risk of bankruptcy and may send

a

signal to potential creditors that the firms is making a

concerted effort to protect the value of the underlying
assets 253

.

This can result in more favorable credit terms

and less costly, restrictive covenants 254

a. 3)

.

Hedging :It Is the Law

Rarely does

firm have to worry about whether failing

a

to hedge is breaking the law.
In Brane v. Roth 255

,

a

In Indiana,

it just might be.

farmers cooperative is engaged in the
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business of buying, storing and selling grain and the
profits had been declining steadily over the period of
1977-1979. In 1979,

its accountant recommended to its Board

of Directors that the cooperative begin hedging in the

futures market. The Board did authorize the financial

manager to begin hedging. But

a

total of only about $20,000

of grain was hedged, during a period in which its grain

sales were over $7 million 256

.

Subsequently, the cooperative

experienced substantial operating losses. Shareholders

determined that

a

hedge would have saved the cooperative

and sued the Board of Directors. The plaintiffs argued that
the Board breached its duty by using a manager

inexperienced in hedging and by failing to supervise the

manager 257

.

The plaintiffs also argued that the Board

members failed to learn enough about hedging to protect
shareholders' interests. The Superior Court of Miami
County,

Indiana agreed and ordered the directors to pay

over $400,000 to the plaintiffs 258

.

The case was appealed to

the Indiana Court of Appeals, which upheld the judgment in

April 1992 259

,

endorsing the argument that the losses were

caused by a failure to hedge and that the directors had
made no effort to learn about hedging. It seems that, in
this case, where the directors erred was in failing to be

properly informed about the advantages and disadvantages of
hedging while authorizing, but not supervising, a modest
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hedging program. Had they made the effort to learn about
the futures market,

they might well have easily justified

the small hedging program as experimental. So,
to hedge illegal? Probably not,

is failing

at least not yet. But it is

clear that Board of Directors, and management, are

vulnerable to the charge that they failed to learn how
derivative markets can help them run

a

business and avoid

losses. Hedging or failing to hedge is a decision that

should be taken by the Board of Directors and is protected

by the Business Judgement rule. On the other hand, it is
also true that failing to disclose that the company is not

hedging might be considered as such important information
that it should be made public so that it would be properly

reflected in the stock price. Anyway, the question might be
asked if the shareholders may not be able to lay off these
risk more cheaply by holding

a

diversified portfolio of

shares in a variety of companies.

a. 4)

Risks Associated with Hedging

In practice hedging is not simple. The amount of the

loss or profit on a hedge will depend upon the relationship

between the cash price and the futures price at two points
in time, when a hedge is placed and when it is lifted 260
a

.

futures contract is priced according to its theoretical

value,

the difference between the cash price and the

If
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futures price should be equal to the cost of carry 261

.

The

risk that the hedger takes on is that the basis will change

hedging involves the

for some reason. Therefore,

substitution of basis risk for price risk, i.e., the

substitution of the risk that the basis will change for the
risk that the cash price will change 262

In some cases,

.

the

price of the commodity being hedged and that of the futures
contract move in opposite directions 263

Then,

.

a

hedge will

produce either a profit or a loss on both the spot and the
futures positions. Hedging also entails another form of

risk called quantity risk 264

.

Suppose a farmer wants to lock

in the price at which an as yet unharvested crop will be

sold 265

.

The farmer might sell a futures contract and

thereby establish the future selling price of the crop. Yet
what the farmer does not know and cannot hedge is the

uncertainty over the size of the crop 266

.

The farmer's total

revenue is the product of the crop's price and its size 267
This risk is not restricted to farming. Many corporations

and financial institutions do not kwow the size of future

hedge positions and thus must contend with quantity risk.

.
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b.

Applications of Futures Contracts

b.l)

Common Applications

Investors can use different strategies. They can use
stock index futures,

interest rates futures for distinct

purposes such as:
-

speculating on the movement of the stock market;

-

controlling the risk of stock portfolio;

-

hedging against adverse stock price or interest rate

movements;
-

engaging in index arbitrage.

A stock index futures contract allows for the buying
and selling of a stock index for a specified price at a

specified date 268

.

For example,

there is a futures contract

on the S&P 500 Index which represents a composite of 500
large corporations. Participants who expect the stock

market to perform well before the settlement date may
consider purchasing S&P 500 Index Futures. Conversely,

participants who expect the stock market to perform poorly
before the settlement date may consider selling the S&P 500
Index Futures. Investment banking firms can use hedging

strategies to protect against adverse interest rate
movements. Presume,

for example,

an investment banker

called Prudential Brothers underwriting $1 billion of ABC
bonds. To protect itself against a rise in interest rates,

which would reduce the value of the bonds, Prudential
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Brothers sell

(short)

Treasury Futures. Let us further

assume that interest rates rise upon an announcement by the
Federal Reserve Board. The value of the ABC bonds held by

Prudential Brothers are declining in value but so do the

Treasury Bond Futures contracts. Because Prudential
Brothers has sold the futures, it realized a gain which

reduced the loss on the bonds it underwrote. Another
strategy,
a

Stock index arbitrage,

is the purchase or sale of

portfolio of stock that replicates

a

stock index and the

sale or purchase of a futures contract on the index 269

.

Derivatives can be used to arbitrage price

discrepancies in financial markets. Arbitrage is

type of

a

transaction in which an investor seeks to profit when the
same good sells for two different prices 270

.

The individual

engaging in the arbitrage, called the arbitrageur, buys the
good at the lower price and immediately sells it at the

higher price 271

.

If a stock sells on one exchange at one

price and on another at a different price, arbitrageurs
will go to work buying at the low price and selling at the

high price. The low price will be driven up and the high

price driven down until the two prices are equal 272

.

Arbitrage thus, keeps prices in line. Another type of
arbitrage can be used to take advantage of differences in
the cost of capital. For example,

suppose a multinational

firm needs to borrow dollars but could receive a
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preferential loan rate from
might borrow German marks

a

(DM)

lender in Germany. This firm
at the more favorable

interest rate and convert the DM to dollars in the currency
market. Then, to hedge the exchange rate risk of the future
loan payments,

the firm might enter into a dollar/DM

currency swap (i.e. pay dollars/ receive DM). In effect, in
this case,

the multinational firms borrows dollars at the

lower German interest rate.

b.2)

Circuit Breakers On Stock Index Futures

The 1987 stock market crash led to recommendations by
a

presidential task force to recommend circuit breakers to

prevent further crashes 273

.

Circuit breakers are trading

restrictions imposed on specific stock or stock indexes 274
For example,

.

if the Dow Jones Industrial Average Stock

Index declines by 250 points below the previous day's

closing price, the New York Stock Exchange prohibits
trading for one hour. The purpose is to allow investors to

determine whether any previous rumors were true and to work
out credit arrangements if they received a margin call 275

b.3)

.

Currency Derivative Markets: Another possible

Application of Futures
Since the downfall of the Bretton Woods system

,

the

currencies of all countries have been fluctuating freely
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which means that all exchanges rates of free countries
fluctuate with market conditions. The volatility of

exchanges rates should be viewed as a source of risk for
companies doing business in more than one country.
The parties can enter into a currency futures contract

which is an agreement between two parties in which one

party agrees to buy the currency from the other party at
later date at an exchange rate agreed upon today276

.

a

It

trades on a futures exchange and works essentially the same
as any other type of futures contract. As noted earlier,

a

long hedge with futures involves the purchase of a futures
contract. In the case of foreign currencies,

for example,

a

long hedger is concerned that the value of the foreign

currency will rise. Consider an American car dealer who
plans to buy 20 British sports cars and each car costs

£35,000 which, of course, will have to be paid in British
currency. Let us assume that based on the current forward
rate of the pound, the dealers' expected cost is $914,200.
If the pound increases in value,

the cars will end up

costing more. Therefore, the dealer wants to hedge by

buying futures on the pound and as long as the pound spot
and futures rates move in the same direction, the hedge
will be successful in reducing some of the loss in the spot

market 277

.

We have talked about currency futures and

options. However, there a number of other related ways to
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for example,

manage foreign exchange risk. It is common,

for firms doing business internationally to use currency

swaps 278 for hedging purposes.

B.

OPTIONS MARKETS

1.

Definition and Key Elements

a.

Definition

There are two parties to an option contract: the buyer

and the writer or seller. The writer (seller) of the option
grants the buyer of the option the right but not the
obligation, to buy from or sell to the writer something at
a

specified price within a specified period of time or at a

specified date 279

.

The writer grants this right to the buyer

in exchange for a certain sum of money which is called the

option price or option premium 280

.

The price at which the

underlying asset or commodity may be bought or sold is
called the exercise price or strike price 281

.

When an option

grants the buyer the right to purchase the underlying asset
from the writer (seller)

it is referred to as a call

-

option or simply a call 282

.

When the option buyer has the

right to sell the underlying asset to the writer

referred to as a put option or simply a put 283

.

-

it is

The timing

of the possible exercise of an option is an important

characteristic of the contract. There are options that may
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be exercised at any time up to including the expiration

date 284

.

Such options are referred to as American options 285

.

Other options may be exercised only at the expiration
date; these are called European options 286

b.

.

Illustrations

b.l)

Call Options

Consider the following illustration: on June 21, 1996, the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange offered Options on the
stock of Prudential Investor. One particular call option

had an exercise price of $80 and an expiration date of July
15.

The Prudential Investor stock had a price of $77,625.

The buyer of this option received the right to buy the

stock any time up through July 15 at $80 per share. The

writer of that option therefore was obligated to sell the
stock at $80 per share through July 15 whenever the buyer

wanted it. For this privilege, the buyer paid the writer
the premium, or price, of $1,375. The buyer anticipates

that the stock's price would rise above $80 before the

option expires. Conversely, the writer expects that the
stock price would not get above $80 before the option
expires.
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b.2)

Put options

Consider the put option on Prudential Investor stock
on June 21,

1996, with an exercise price of $80 per share

and an expiration date of July 15. It allows the put holder
to sell the stock at $80 per share any time up through July
15.

The stock currently is selling for $77,625. Therefore,

the put holder can elect to exercise the option,

selling

the stock to the writer for $80 per share. However,

the put

holder may prefer to wait and see if the stock price falls
further below the exercise price. The put buyer expects the
stock price to fall, while the writer expects it to remain
the same or rise. The buyer and the writer negotiated a

premium of $3.75, which the buyer paid to the writer.

2,

Difference Between Option and Futures Contracts

In an option contract,

the option buyer has the right,

but not the obligation, to exercise the option. On the

other hand, the writer does have the obligation to perform.
In the case of a futures contract both buyer and seller are

constrained to perform. The relation risk/rewards features
are also different. In a futures contract,

the buyer of the

contract realizes a dollar for dollar gain when the price
of the futures contract increases, and suffers a dollar for

dollar loss when the price drops 287 The opposite occurs for
.

the seller of a futures contract 288

.

In an option contract,
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the most that the buyer can lose is the option price. The

maximum profit that the writer may realize is the option
price. There are no margin requirements for the buyer of an

option once the option price has been paid in full 289

.

Because the option price is the maximum amount that
the investor can lose, no matter how adverse the price

movement of the underlying asset, no margin is needed 290

.

Because the writer (seller) of an option has agreed to
accept all of the risk (and none of the reward) of the

position in the underlying asset, the writer is generally
required to put up the option price received as margin 291
In addition,

affect the writer'

.

as price changes occur that adversely
s

position, the writer is required to

deposit additional margin (with some exceptions) as the

position is marked-to-market 292

.

Options may be traded

either on an organized exchange or in the over-the-counter
market.

3.

Futures Options

An option on a futures contract, referred to as a
futures option, gives the buyer the right to buy from or
sell to the writer a designated futures contract at a

designated price at any time during the life of the
option 293

.

If the futures option is a call option,

the buyer

has the right to purchase one designated futures contract
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at the exercise price 294

,

i.e.,

the buyer has the right to

acquire a long futures position in the designated futures
contract. If the buyer exercises the call option, the

writer (seller) acquires a corresponding short position in
the futures contract 295

.

A put option futures contract

grants the buyer the right to sell one designated futures

contract to the writer at the exercise price 296

4.

Applications of Options Markets

a.

Stock Options and Stock Index Options

.

Stock Options can be used to take advantage of the

anticipated price movement of individual stocks.

Alternatively they can help protect current or anticipated
positions in individual stocks 297

b.

.

Interest Rate Options

An institutional investor can use interest rate
options or options on interest rate futures to speculate on

fixed-income security price movements based on expectations
of interest rates changes 298

.
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C.

1.

REGULATION OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CF TC) and

Stock Exchange Commission

(SEC)

Regulate Trading in

Options and Futures
Two agencies share responsibility for the Federal

regulation of trading in futures and options. The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission licenses futures exchanges and

monitors trading in them 299

.

It authorizes firms to operate

the exchanges and provide services to the public 300

.

The CFTC also approves individual futures contracts

which must serve the economic purpose for being useful for
hedging 301

.

Approval is not an endorsement of

a

contract,

investors trade these securities at their own risk 302

.

The

SEC has responsibility for oversight of most options

markets and it performs many of the functions the CFTC
performs with futures markets 303

.

An exchange that wants to

create an options contract must obtain approval from either
the CFTC or the Securities and Exchange Commission.

a.

Regulation of Options

The exchange-traded options industry is regulated at

several levels. While Federal and state regulations

predominate, the industry also regulates itself according
to rules and standards established by the exchanges and the
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Options Clearing Corporation 304

.

The Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) is the primary regulator of the options
market 305

.

The SEC's general purpose is to ensure full

disclosure of all pertinent information on publicly offered
investments 306

.

It has the authority to establish certain

rules and procedures and to investigate possible violation
of Federal securities laws 307

.

If the SEC observes a

violation it may seek injunctive relief, recommend that the
Justice Department press charges, or impose some sanctions
itself 308

b.

.

Regulation of Futures

While forward markets are largely unregulated and

traded over-the-counter, futures markets are heavily

regulated 309

.

Many regulators and legislators have taken

dim view of futures

trading,

likening it to gambling 310

the nineteenth century,

there were numerous attempts to

outlaw futures trading 311

.

a
.

In

In 1974 Congress passed the

Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act which created the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a Federal Reserve
agency that regulates futures markets 312

.

74

D.

TRADING LOCATIONS

1

Stock Exchanges

.

An exchange is

a

legal corporate entity organized for

the trading of securities, options or futures 313

provides

a

.

It

physical facility and stipulates rules and

regulations governing the transactions in the instruments
trading thereon 314

.

One of the exchange's important ongoing

activities is identifying new and useful futures contracts.

When the exchange determines that
to be successful,

a

it writes a proposal specifying the terms

and conditions and applies to the CFTC,
activity,

contract is likely

the regulatory

for permission to initiate trading 315

.

Whether the

contract will be actively traded will depend on whether it
fills the needs of hedgers and whether speculators are

interested enough to take risks in it 316

.

Organized

exchanges filled the need for standardized option contracts

wherein the exchange would specify the contracts' terms and
conditions 317

.

As a result, a secondary market for the

contracts was made possible. By providing a physical
trading floor, specifying rules and regulations, and

standardizing contracts, options became as marketable as
stocks 318

.

The New York Stock Exchange and American Stock

Exchange are for example two organized exchanges for
secondary stock market transactions.
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2.

Over-the-Counter M arket

(OTC)

A large amount of option trading is conducted
privately between two parties who find that contracting
with each other may be preferable to public transactions on
the exchange. The Over-the-Counter market is basically a

telecommunications network 319

.

Most of the options created

on the over-the-counter market are options on bonds,

interest rates, commodities, swaps,

foreign currencies and

include many variations that combine options with other

instruments 320

.

The scope of this market, dominated by

institutional investors is world-wide 321

.

These private

contracts are entered into by large corporations, financial
institutions, and sometimes even governments in which the

option buyer is either familiar with the creditworthiness
of the writer or has had the credit risk reduced by some

type of collateral guarantee or other credit enhancement 322

OTC intermediaries may act as brokers, matching parties

with offsetting needs. More typically, intermediaries act
as counterparties,

taking the other side of the contracts

with their customers. Without intermediaries, it would be
difficult for firms particularly nonfinancial firms, to
find willing counterparties in a timely fashion. Thus,

intermediaries increase the liquidity of the OTC

derivatives market and, thereby, make OTC derivatives more
useful to end-users. Although there is always some credit

.
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risk involved, these types of OTC contracts do have several

advantages. The first advantage is that the terms and

conditions of these contracts, which are entered into
privately, can be tailored to the specific needs of the two

parties 323

,

avoiding thereby the mandatory rules and

regulations of the exchanges. The second benefit is that
the over-the-counter market is a private market in which

neither the general public nor other investors, including
competitors, need know that the transactions were

completed 324

.

A third advantage for investors

is that this

market is essentially unregulated: its rules are those of
common sense business honesty and courtesy 325

.

This largely

unregulated environment means that government approval is
not needed to offer new types of options 326

.

An inevitable

drawback omnipresent in this market is that credit risk
exists, excluding many customers who are unable to

establish their creditworthiness in this market 327

.

This is also one of the reasons why banks have played

such a large role in the growth of the OTC market. Banks'

creditworthiness is well known to other investors, so money
center banks are readily accepted as counterparties in OTC
trades. In addition, banks already lend to many of the

investors in OTC derivatives, thus they already know more
than other market participants about the creditworthiness
of these investors. And in cases where a bank is not
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already familiar with

a

particular investor, the bank

possesses the expertise to make an informed judgment of
creditworthiness. Nonetheless, because of the private
nature of the transactions that take place in this market,
it is difficult to measure its size 326

.

The over-the-counter

market is an unregulated market, dominated by customs and

accepted procedures. The participating firms, however, are
often regulated by the National Association of Securities
Dealers

(NASD)

and many participants are banks who are

overseen by various regulatory authorities but neither the
SEC nor the CFTC has direct regulatory authority over the

OTC options market 329

.

On the other hand,

exchange-traded

instruments present also advantages over the over-thecounter market. The first is the standardization of the

exercise price, the quantity of the underlying asset, and
the expiration date of the contract 330

.

as in the

Second,

case of futures contracts, the direct link between buyer

and seller is severed after the order is executed because
of the interchange ability of exchange-traded options 331

.

The clearinghouse associated with the exchange where the

option trades performs the same function

(a

guarantee

function)

in the options market that it does in the futures

market 332

Finally, the transaction costs are lower for

.

exchange-traded options than for OTC options 333

.

The higher

cost of an OTC option reflects the cost of customizing the
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option for the common situation where an institutional
investor needs to have a tailor-made option because the

standardized exchange-traded option does not satisfy its
investment objectives 334

a.

.

Swaps Considered To Be The Quintessential OTC

Derivative Swaps, considered to be the quintessential OTC
derivative 335

,

are a type of forward contract in which two

parties agree to exchange a series of payments according to

agreed-upon terms over

a set

period of time 336

.

The amount

of the payments involved is determined with reference to an

agreed-upon notional amount which, aside from currency swap
transactions, is seldom actually exchanged 337

.

Because the

terms of a swap must be carefully tailored to benefit the
parties' needs, this type of derivative instrument is a

privately negotiated, OTC transaction. These periodic
payments may be fixed 338 or floating 339

,

and the exchange is

made because each party seeks the form of payment held by
the other party 340

.

To illustrate how a swap works,

imagine

two mortgagors holding mortgages with a current interest

rate of ten percent. Mortgagor A'

s

mortgage has a floating

interest rate, and A believes that interest rates will
rise. Mortgagor B holds a fixed rate mortgage,

and he is

convinced that interest rates will go down. In this case,
each mortgagor believes his position would be enhanced if
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only his mortgage carried the form of interest rate

(a

type

of periodic payment) held by the other. A common swap

agreement,

known as an "interest rate swap" 341

each mortgagor to get his wish by,

would allow

,

contractually

in effect,

agreeing to take the other's interest position. At the end
of a period of time specified in the contract,

the

mortgagors would "settle up" between themselves based on
the actual movement of interest rates 342

.

These payments

would normally be calculated and made on the same day,
allowing the parties simply to net their payments; the

party who, at the end of the given period, holds the higher
of the two interest obligations simply pays the other the

net difference 343

.

If,

in our example,

interest rates

increased during the period, mortgagor B would owe

mortgagor A an amount equal to the net difference in the
amount due under each rate. Had interest rates decreased

during the given period, the same obligations would exist,
except that it would then be mortgagor A who owed mortgagor
B the net amount. It is important to note that,

e,ven

after

mortgagors entered into the swap contract, each still held,
and was bound by the terms of his original mortgage
agreement. The swap arrangement, however, effectively

converted the interest component of mortgagor A'
a

s

debt from

floating to a fixed rate, and mortgagor B's interest

component from a fixed to a floating rate 344

.

Swaps are
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commonly used as hedging devices by corporations, banks,
and other financial institutions. End-users of swaps are

often hesitant to deal directly with one another (usually

because each party feels it cannot adequately assess the
other party's creditworthiness), creating an opportunity
for banks and other financial institutions to act as

intermediaries 345

.

As intermediary, a bank enters into

a

swap arrangement with both parties and accepts the risks

associated with both transactions 346

.

Bearing this risk

allows the intermediary to command a higher fixed or

floating rate on a swap than it pays on another, the spread

between the rates amounting to income 347

.

As another

illustration of how swaps can provide such protection,
consider the case of a hypothetical bank. The nature of the
bank's business makes it an interest rate sensitive entity.
The bank has an extensive portfolio of floating rate loans,

but is also obliged to pay interest on deposits to attract

customers and capital 348

.

While the floating rate on the

loan is adjusted often, the rate of interest paid on

deposits is adjusted less frequently

-

say biannually 349

.

Because of the time lag in the frequency with which these
rates are adjusted, a downturn in market interest rates

would expose the bank to potential losses; interest
collected on outstanding loans would be adjusted downward
to reflect the market fluctuation, but the rate the bank
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pays on its deposits would not be reduced for some time 350

.

The bank's potential for loss, which in this case would be

from what is known as "interest rate risk", could be hedged

with a swap contract. Under the terms of such an agreement,
the bank would make payments based on some floating

interest rate, and in return would receive payments based
on a fixed interest rate from a counterparty, each rate

being determined with respect to some agreed-upon (though

usually hypothetical) notional amount 351
swap,

the bank'

s

.

Because of the

position is protected whether interest

rates rise or fall: if rates go up, the bank's earnings

from its floating rate loans increase, offsetting the

higher amounts it would then pay on the floating rate

obligations acquired in the swap. If, on the other hand,
interest rates decline, the bank's fixed-rate payouts will
be offset by the fixed-rate stream of income it receives

under the swap agreement. The downside of the agreement and
of hedge transactions in general,

is that when an entity

transfers risk, the opportunity for gain is transferred as
well. A firm that hedges all its risks is protected from

losses but is equally prevented from realizing a gain. The
key for a bank in the derivatives market is to achieve a

balance between hedged positions and acceptable risks 352

.
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E.

THE BENEFITS OF DERIVATIVE MARKETS

Due to their great flexibility, derivatives are used

by many different type of investors. A good toolbox of
derivatives allows the modern investor the full range of
investment strategy: speculation, hedging, arbitrage and
all combinations thereof. Derivatives have numerous

benefits over the corresponding cash (spot) market for the
same financial asset.

1.

Risk management

Because derivatives are related to the prices of the

underlying spot market goods, they can be used to reduce or
increase the risk of investing in the spot items 353
In general,

.

rational investors want to keep their

investments at an acceptable risk level. Derivative markets
enable those wishing to reduce their risk to transfer it to
those wishing to increase it 354

.

As a result, investors are

willing to supply more funds to the financial markets,
which in turn, benefits the economy because it enables more
firms to raise capital and keeps the cost of capital as low
as possible 355

.

An additional benefit realized by derivative

end-users is an enhancement of creditworthiness. An entity
that has reduced its exposure to market risks by hedging 356

.
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with derivatives is generally able to obtain more

preferable financial terms.

2.

Price D iscovery

It has been said that futures and forward markets for

example,

are an important means of obtaining information

about investor's expectations of futures prices 357

.

Consequently, these markets can be used as an indicator and

contain information about future spot prices.

3.

Operational Advantages

Depending on the derivative instrument, it may cost
less to execute a transaction in the derivatives market in

order to adjust the risk exposure of an investor's

portfolio to new economic information than it would cost to
make that adjustment in the cash market 358

.

Derivatives

entail lower transaction costs 359 (commissions and other

trading costs are lower for traders in these markets)

4.

Market Efficiency

Market efficiency is the characteristic of a market in
which the prices of the instruments trading therein reflect
their true economic values to investors 360

.

As noted

earlier, we know that there is a linkage between spot and

derivative markets. The ease and low cost of trading in the

.
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derivative markets, facilitate the arbitrage trading and
rapid price adjustments that quickly eliminate these profit

opportunities 361

.

Consequently, society benefits because the

prices of the underlying goods more accurately reflect the
goods'

5.

true economic values 362

.

Reduce Cost of Portfolio

Derivatives are also used as a tool by which end-users
reduce funding costs. In many cases,

investing in a

derivative is considerably less costly than purchasing the

underlying asset itself because of reduced transaction
costs and the leverage the instrument provides 363

reduce the cost of administering a portfolio and enable

managers to buy and sell big positions without distorting
prices

6.

Speculation

The derivatives market provide the opportunity for

speculation. The term speculation refers to the taking of

calculated risks in an attempt to profit by anticipating
(for speculating on)

changes in the market 364

.

Where hedgers seek to protect themselves by

transferring risk, speculators take risks by betting on
fluctuations in the market value of derivatives or

underlying assets. Just as derivatives provide the hedger
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with an affordable means of protecting his position, a

speculator may likewise utilize derivatives to reap the
(or incur the losses)

benefits

of a market movement without

having to actually buy or sell the underlying asset 365

.

In

general, the participation of speculators enhances the

market by providing an outlet onto which dealers can shift
the risks they have acquired from hedging end-users,

thereby adding liquidity to the market and ensuring that

participants cannot only take a position but get rid of it
as well 366
So,

.

speculators play an important role in the market

by providing the liquidity that makes hedging possible and
assuming the risk that hedgers are trying to eliminate 367

.

Nonetheless, speculation is arguable and derivative markets
have taken much criticism from experts and outsiders for
this kind of activity. Speculators include locals as well
as the thousands of individuals and institutions off the

exchange floor 368

7.

.

Derivatives Market Is Faster and More Liquid

Due to the smaller amount of capital required for

participation in derivative markets, these markets,
especially futures and options exchanges, have greater
liquidity than the spot markets 369

.

Since little capital is

required to trade them, these markets can absorb more
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transactions. Some derivative markets can absorb a greater

dollar transaction without an adverse effect on price of
the derivative instrument,

i.e.,

the derivative market may

be more liquid than the cash market 370

.

In addition,

transactions typically can be accomplished faster in the
derivative markets 371
of derivatives,

.

However, one of the major attraction

the feature that gets people excited,

is

gearing (or leverage in the U.S.). Gearing means simply the

ability for derivatives to soar 100% in a few days, when
the underlying asset, a security for example, has only

risen by 10%. Anyone who has a mortgage is geared to the

property market. The problem is that many derivatives allow
investors to make huge market bets without paying the full
price. Indeed, no money at all changes hands in some

derivative trades. That is one way derivatives reduce
investors' costs but it also means that they create a lot
of leverage in the system.

CHAPTER VI:
DANGERS AND RISKS OF DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES

RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF DERIVATIVES

A.

With the promise of increased rewards come increased
risks 372

.

Derivatives carry risks similar to those

traditionally assumed by banks, especially banks dealing
with securities 373

.

More specifically, derivatives pose six

risks: credit risk, market risk,

liquidity risk,

operational risk, systemic risk and legal risk. Credit
also called "counterparty risk" or "settlement risk",

risk,

is the risk that the bank's trading partner will be either

unwilling or unable to meet its contractual obligation 374

.

The buyer may be exposed to the risk that the seller

may default and not deliver the security. In fact, most
derivative transactions begin with no risk at all. In most
cases,

credit risk develops only gradually, as market

prices change, and all of the risk is borne by that party
in whose favor the prices have changed. This risk, measured

by the replacement cost of the deal, is comparable to
classic credit exposure. Market risk, also called "position
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risk",

is the risk that the value of the asset underlying a

derivative moves in
the derivative 375

.

a

direction that reduces the value of

Two elements are at work: the volatility

of the underlying asset's value and the sensitivity of the

futures or options contract to changes in the underlying
asset value 376

.

the market value of an

For example,

underlying security purchased by

a

firm may fall before it

can be resold. In the case of an equity security, or stock,

concerns about the financial performance of the corporate
issuer may lead to a decline in the price of the

security 377

.

In the case of a debt security,

or bond,

the

nonpayment of principal or interest by the issuer, or

a

change in interest rates, may lead to a subsequent decline
in the value of the security 378

Liquidity risk is the risk

.

that fluctuations in the price of derivatives will cause

unexpected changes in the cash flow of
unable to meet its obligation 379

.

bank rendering it

a

Liquidity also includes

situations in which a market participant cannot execute a

transaction at a fair price because of wide bid-ask
spreads, meaning that a bank would have less certainty

about the true value of the instrument 380

.

This risk is

particularly important in highly structured or customized
transactions because it may be difficult to locate a

counterparty to enter into

a

transaction in a timely

manner. Exchange-traded activities are less subject to
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market liquidity risks than are OTC traded derivatives

because of their use of standardized contracts and the
settlement role of the clearinghouse. Generally, the

liquidity of these instruments is impaired only in times of
financial stress. Operational risk is the risk associated

with human error, system failures or procedural
failures 381 (e.g.

,

database management, trade entry, trade

processing, trade confirmation, payment, delivery,

collateral management, valuation and related information
systems 382

)

.

A big fear

is that inadequate internal

controls, error, system failure or fraud lead to unexpected

losses and the bank may not even know it exceeds its

position limits 383

.

In some cases,

derivative transactions

are so intricate that they can be developed and priced only

through sophisticated mathematical models. Given that
complexity, the internal risk management and control

systems of banks engaged in these transactions must exhibit
a high level of sophistication.

It is also essential that

effective lines of communication be established between
senior management and the management and staff of the

operating and trading departments that execute, value,
record,

and monitor derivative product transactions.

Systemic risk can be defined as the risk that the financial

difficulties of one institution will cause financial harm
to other institutions and eventually cause a complete
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breakdown in the financial system 384

.

For example,

the

collapse of securities prices could lead to the default of
one or more large banks or securities firms. Because of

financial interrelationships, this could lead to further

defaults of banks 385

.

As noted earlier, technological

advances have increased the integration and efficiency of
the global financial market. Due to the linkage among the

markets, a series of defaults in one market could swiftly

extend into the banking system and cause a disruption in
the flow of payments and settlements of financial

transactions throughout the world 386

.

Shocks could be

transmitted from one domestic market to other domestic
markets. Such a breakdown in capital markets could disrupt
the process of saving and investment, undermine the long-

term confidence of private investors, and disrupt the
normal course of economic transactions 387

.

Finally,

legal

risk is the risk that a derivatives contract is invalid or

unenforceable 388

.

The contract might be unenforceable when

the other party does not have the authority to contract or

trade the transaction. Over-the-counter derivative

instruments, rather than exchanged-traded instruments, have

generally been the focus of this risk. In addition,
reputation risk might sometimes also been involved. The
risk might exist that a bank might lose a client, or its

ability to compete effectively for new clients, due to
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perceptions that the bank does not deal fairly with clients
or that it does not know how to properly manage its

derivatives business 389

.

Finally, another potential risk stemmed from the fact

that derivative instruments were "off balance-sheet" items
that were only mentioned in footnotes to the financial

statements of firms dealing in derivatives 390

.

The footnote

material provided very little data as to the amount of risk
or profits and losses from those instruments. It was at the

urging of the SEC that firms engaging in derivative
transactions have disclosed their profits and losses from
that activity 391

.

However, this still presents a limited

window, because not all institutions are disclosing

complete information 392

.

The above risks,

although defined

individually, are often realized simultaneously (i.e., risk

may be interconnected. This is particularly true when there
is a structural realignment of market prices in a given

marketplace (e.g., the September 1992 currency crisis in
the European Exchange Rate Management

(ERM)

system)

393
.

During such periods, there can often be a concurrent
increase in market risk, a reduction in market liquidity,
and an increase in credit risk, all of which increase

systemic risk.
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SPECIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF

B.

DERIVATIVES

Derivatives, however, pose other dangers based on the

magnitude and uncertainty of the repercussions. Derivatives
create the ability to realize the full profit or loss of
"owing" an asset for a fraction of the price of the
asset 394

.

As derivatives are high leveraged instruments,

both buyers and sellers face substantial risks. Recall the
gold example used previously in chapter IV B
to enter into a contract,

(3)

,

in order

each party would have to put very

little money, perhaps $2,000 collateral on a contract

initially valued at $40,000. As noted in that example,

a

change of $20 per ounce in the value of the underlying
asset,

a

mere 5% change, would result in a $2,000 profit

for one party and a $2,000 loss for the other. Assuming the

parties need only $2,000 in order to enter

party has made

a 100%

a

contract, one

return on the investment and the

other has suffered a 100% loss. If, in contrast, the

parties were required to buy 100 ounces of gold at $400 per
ounce,

they would need $40,000 in capital and a $20 change

would only result in

a 5%

gain or loss for each party. As

mentioned earlier, derivatives may also be used to
speculate and generate large profits. Recently, derivatives
have been packaged in increasingly sophisticated forms and
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sold to and by banks, mutual funds and large corporations
as speculative instruments and not insurance tools 395

.

Thus,

instead of using derivatives as a hedge to lessen risks,
banks began to invest in derivatives as a highly leveraged

play on interest rates or any other asset in order to make
a

profit. Another threat that could menace the stability of

the financial system are the so-called Hedges funds. Hedges

funds are investment partnerships with fewer than 100

limited partners and are completely unregulated 396

Wealthy

.

individuals invest a minimum of $1 million each, which the
fund leverages by borrowing primarily from banks 397

.

Without

hard numbers, observers estimate leveraging ranges from
to 20 times, with an average of about 10 398

.

2

Hedges funds

came under attack in 1992 for betting big against the

European Monetary Union and the narrow Exchange Rate
Mechanism, and winning 399

.

Additionally, failure in risk monitoring, the function
that identifies, measures, monitors and reports on the
market, credit and liquidity risks incurred by the firm 400

,

and deficiencies in risk management, the process within a
firm by which risk guidelines are established, allocated
and managed 401

,

have been leading some banks to a complete

collapse as will be illustrated in the next chapters with
the Barings PLC case. In this context,
to note,

it is not surprising

that while the regulators are slowly awakening
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that derivative instruments are now posing several threats
if for no other reason than their

to the financial system,

size alone, derivatives have taken much criticism by the

financial press and financial specialists. Indeed, some

investors and the popular press consider that the

introduction of

futures market for a financial asset will

a

increase the price volatility of that financial asset in
the cash market 402
a

.

Some market observers advocate that,

as

result of speculative trading of futures contract, the

cash market instrument does not reflect its fundamental

economic value 403

.

The implication here is that the price of

the financial asset would better reflect its true economic

value in the absence of
asset 404

.

Furthermore,

a

futures market for that financial

critics assert that futures contracts

in which the underlying asset is a stock market index has

created greater volatility for stock market prices 405

.

While

empirical evidence has not supported this view, the key
point is that increased volatility of stock market prices

may be due to the greater quantity and frequency of
information released by the government about important
economic indicators that affect the value of the common
stock of all companies 406

.

That information itself is

subject to a great deal of variability 407

.

So,

if there is

any observed increase in the volatility of stock prices,
that volatility may be due to the substantial variability
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of economic information, not to the presence of a futures

contract on a stock market index 408

.

According to some

financial industry regulators, two "worst derivative

nightmare" 409 scenarios are of particular concern. In the
first scenario, a localized financial disaster is fomented

when bankers, using derivatives without fully understanding
their risks, deplete the capital reserves of a major bank,

thereby causing it to fail 410

.

The second scenario suggest a

more devastating, potentially system-wide disaster. Here,
the interconnections created by the use of derivatives

generates a chain of obligations between financial

institutions worldwide, and a seemingly isolated failure to
meet interbank payment obligations produces a domino effect
among market dealers and participants, precipitating a

major systemic financial crisis 411

.

The fear that activity

in the derivatives market could lead to a destabilization

of the U.S.

based on

a

(or even global market)

financial system is

series of factors, all of which contribute to

the potential for a large scale crisis. One important

element is the sheer size of the derivatives market 412

.

The

multi-trillion dollar notional value of outstanding
derivative contracts is so large that the derivative
activities of the ten largest American commercial banks
alone amount to more than double the gross domestic product
in the United States, which in turn is "more money than all
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money in the world 413 ." Of even greater concern is the fact
that the bulk of derivative dealing activity is

concentrated among

relatively small number of firms 414

a

.

According to the International Swaps and Derivatives

Association (ISDA)

only 150 firms were derivatives dealers

,

worldwide as of December 1992 415

.

Furthermore, dealing

activities were concentrated among a small percentage of
these institutions 416

.

The potential problem brought on by

this concentration of dealing activities is clear to both

regulators and market participants: the abrupt failure or

withdrawal from the market of even one major dealer could

seriously degrade market liquidity, undermining the
stability of numerous markets simultaneously 417
to these concerns,

.

In addition

the financial linkage that derivatives

create among user institutions and the markets in which the

instruments are traded also contributes to the potential
for a major market meltdown 418

.

Regulators feel that the

linkage element would make a financial crisis difficult to

contain if one major dealer failed to meet its

obligation 419

.
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C.

REGULATORS VIEW RISKS DIFFERENTLY FOR BANKS AND

SECURITIES FIRMS

Because bank asset turnover is slow and securities
firm asset turnover is relatively high, bank risk changes

more slowly than securities risk 420

.

Banks have

traditionally invested most of their funds in long-term
illiquid assets, such as loans to customers 421

.

These funds

come from highly liquid customer deposits as well as

borrowings and the banks' own capital 422

.

Banks have

traditionally kept these assets until maturity. As

a

result, bank regulators focus on credit risk as the most

important and predominant risk. Conversely, because of
their high asset turnover, securities firms must be able to

absorb the effect of changing market values of their

portfolios as they occur 423

.

Consequently, securities

regulators emphasize valuing securities positions at market
prices to provide a margin of safety against potential
losses that can be incurred as a result of market

fluctuations 424

.

CHAPTER VII:

NEED FOR REGULATORY ACTIONS

A.

DERIVATIVE THREATS PROVE TO BE ALL TOO REAL

Experience proved all too soon that concerns with the
dangers presented by derivative instruments were not

entirely unwarranted 425

defaulted on

.

To cite some examples, Macy' s

swap contract that involved some $83 million

a

in interest payments 426 ; Gibson Greetings Inc. lost $19

million dollars from derivative trading 427 ; Procter

&

Gamble

lost over $150 million from derivative trading 428 ; Orange

County in California lost $140 million 429 ; A unit of

Metallgesellschaft A.G.

(The German Metal and Oil company)

lost 1.37 billion dollars from mismatched derivative

transactions 430

;

Dell Computer lost 26 million dollars 431 ;

City College of Chicago has sued claiming that it was

misled in the purchase of $100 million in derivative
obligations 432

.

The three biggest players in derivatives

today are New York banks: Chemical Bank, Bankers Trust and

Citicorp 433
for over

6

.

Together these three banks are into this market

trillion dollars, Chemical Bank alone for 2.5
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trillion dollars 434

Following highly publicized losses at

.

major corporations, derivatives have come under increasing
scrutiny over the past few years.

B.

INCREASED SCRUTINY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS

The amounts of these losses are impressive and they

have not passed unnoticed by regulators, Congress and the

industry itself 435

.

A number of often voluminous reports

have been published on financial derivatives and the

dangers they pose 436

.

The losses incurred by some derivative

dealers have intensified congressional efforts to regulate
the rapidly growing and increasingly sophisticated

derivatives market. Banking regulators have admitted that
they do not fully understand the risks to individual banks
and the systemic risks that derivatives pose 437

.

The

constant change in the value of a derivative that arises as
a result of the

constant change in the value of the

underlying asset makes it very difficult for banking
regulators to determine which institutions are holding
risky derivatives 438
that,

.

Some members of the Congress believe

in the case of many market innovations,

will not be promulgated until a crisis comes 439

regulations
.

Congress

held several hearings on derivatives in 1994. Members of
the House Banking Committee expressed skepticism about the
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ability of federal agencies to regulate the fast-growing
derivatives market and suggested in 1993 that new laws may
be necessary 440

.

The Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene

agreed that current reporting requirements are not

Ludwig,

adequate 441

.

He argued that regulators are looking at ways

to require banks to reveal more information about the

impact of their activities on their earnings. The

Comptroller of the Currency directed banks under his

regulatory supervision to adopt comprehensive risk

management systems for their derivative trading 442

.

He also

required banks to ensure that the derivative products they
are selling are appropriate for their customers 443

.

The

Comptroller of the Currency requires banks to make sure
that they understand and can monitor and control derivative

risks 444

.

The Federal Reserve Board advised its supervisory

officials that banks examinations should include a

determination of the bank maintains written policies and
procedures concerning the institution'

s

procedures for derivative activities 445

.

risk management

Bank examiners have

also been directed to review internal control and audit

procedures for derivatives, to determine whether senior

management of the bank is evaluating regularly the
procedures to manage risk of derivative instruments and
whether management control is independent of those

conducting trading activities 446

.

In addition, banks
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supervised by the Federal Reserve Board are to conduct
stress tests on their derivatives, risk taking guidelines

should be implemented, reporting systems should be in
place,

credit risks should be assessed, credit limits

imposed,

liquidity risks should be managed and internal

controls and audits should be in place 447

.

The SEC has also

been placing pressure on firms it regulates to present more
financial information about their derivative trading

activities 448

.

Members of Congress repeatedly mentioned the

complexity and size of the derivatives market. Mr. Gonsalez
said the theoretical risk of loss that some big banks face

exceeds their capital several times over 449

.

A massive

report was prepared by the minority staff of the House

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban affairs that

contained recommendations for the imposition of
strengthened regulatory standards 450

.

Among other things,

these recommendations sought a strong capital requirement
to guard against risks posed by derivative instruments,

greater coordination among regulatory authorities to assure

comparable regulatory standards, enhancement of disclosure
standards for firms using derivative instruments, and

requirements for specific written policies on risk
standards that would be approved by the boards of directors
of these firms 451

.

The financial industry is generally

united behind the position that the current combination of
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self-regulation and government supervision provides enough

protection against widespread losses from derivatives 452
in the financial industry,

However, there is a fear,

.

that

legislation would slow the development of products that are

marketed primarily as ways to hedge and reduce risk rather
than speculation 453

.

The FDIC is of the view that the

combination of sound institution management, market forces
and proper regulatory supervision under existing
guidelines, sharply reduces the potential of serious damage
to the banking industry 454

.

Another study was also conducted by
Committee of the Group of Thirty,

a

a

Steering

private group of major

financial institutions, and expressed the view that

"derivatives by their nature do not introduce risk of

a

fundamental difference or of greater scale than those

already present in the financial market 455 ." The study
asserted that "supervisory concerns can be addressed within
the present regulatory structures and approaches 456

.

The

Group is of the view that "there is a danger in imposing

regulatory formulas that inhibit new product innovation or
discourage firms from developing the individualized, robust
risk management systems on which they should rely 457 ." Also
the Group did note: "Because over-the-counter derivatives

are customized transactions,

they often assemble risks in

complex ways. This can make the measurement and control of
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these risks more difficult and create the possibility of

unexpected loss 456 ." The Group of Thirty study sought to
"define a set of sound risk management practices for

dealers and end-users of derivatives and instruments 459 ."
The Group also addressed the many problems encountered in
the over-the-counter market.

In this regard,

it made

recommendations to help those using over-the-counter
derivatives to manage their activity. These recommendations
included the following:

(1)

establishment of risk

management policies at the highest levels of firms on the
firms use of derivatives;

(2)

marking of derivatives at

their market price for risk management purposes;

(3)

quantification of market risks by stimulations and
forecasting;

(4)

counterparties;

assessment of credit risks from
(5)

reduction of credit risk by master

agreements that have netting provisions;

(6)

establishment

of market and credit risk management functions;

(7)

employment of professionals to manage derivative risks;

establishment of management information systems; and

(8)

(9)

adoption of accounting and disclosure practices with
greater transparency 460

.

Unfortunately, no consensus has yet

been reached among the industry and regulators as to what
is the appropriate regulatory model that should be applied.

Nonetheless, the number of reports on derivative

instruments along with regulatory proposals continue to
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surface because the risks posed by derivatives have been
and will continue to be substantial 461

.

C.

EXISTING REGULATION

1.

Guidelines of the Regula tory Banking Agencies

Financial derivatives did not begin to gain widespread
use until the early 1980s 462

.

Before then, banks did not

have specific guidance from regulators with respect to
their derivative activities 463

.

As a practical matter,

therefore banks' ability to engage in these activities was
subject to the general principle that those activities be

based on principles of safety and soundness 464
earlier,

.

As noted

Federal and State bank supervision regulators have

authority over banks' activities in derivatives as well as
traditional banks products. As derivative activity has
increased, however, regulators, both formally and

informally, have been providing guidance with respect to
the procedures banks should follow as they deal in or use

financial derivatives. The OCC published its Banking

Circular No. 79 which for several years was treated by many
banks as the principal regulatory pronouncement concerning

bank participation in derivative activities 465

.

More recent

guidance was provided in late 1993 and early 1994 by the
OCC,

the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. The guidelines
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start with the premise that each bank is ultimately

responsible for understanding the risks arising from its
own derivative activities. At the same time, they include

requirements for banks trading in derivatives to confirm
the legal authority of counterparties to enter into

derivative transactions, make certain disclosures to
counterparties, and assess the appropriateness of the

derivative instruments to counterparties 466

.

The ultimate

rationale for this guidance is to ensure that banks engage
in derivative activities safely and soundly by protecting

themselves from attendant credit, legal, and reputational
risks. Although the guidelines address issues of

appropriateness, they do so in the context of risk

management at the bank and do not establish suitability
standards for the protection of unsophisticated

customers 467

.

They are prudential supervision examiner

guidelines, not customer protection rules. Through these
guidelines,

federal agencies require banks under their

jurisdiction to establish and maintain written supervisory
policies for all derivative activities, which must be

approved by their respective boards of directors 468

.

In

addition, board approval is required before any new

derivative activities may be undertaken 469

.

Banking

regulators also have identified numerous areas of
fundamental risk inherent in financial derivatives. These
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include market, credit, systemic,

operational risk

-

liquidity,

legal and

all of which may be associated with non-

derivative financial instruments as well. Regulators
require banks to establish procedures to identify any other
risk associated with financial derivatives through

managerial oversight and responsibilities, risk

measurements and limits, reporting processes and
operational controls 470

.

Concurrently, the regulators have

made it clear, in their recent statements, that they
recognize the benefits that financial derivatives can
confer on banks and other users, and that their regulations
are not intended to discourage the use of such products 471

2.

.

Circular No. 277 of the OCC and The Federal Reserve's

Supervisor y Issuance SR93-69
The Federal Reserve issued examiner guidelines for

derivatives trading activities of State member banks 472

which parallels provisions of the Capital Markets and
Trading Activities Manual, as well as complementary
guidelines directed at State member bank's use of off-

balance-sheet derivative instruments as end-users 473
The Board'

s

.

guidance instructs State member banks

engaging in derivatives trading activities, in their

evaluation of the counterparty's creditworthiness, to
consider both the counterparty's "overall financial

,
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strength.

.

.

and the ability to perform on its obligation"

and its "ability to understand and manage the risks

inherent in a derivative product 474

."

Thus, banks must take

steps to "ascertain the character and financial

sophistication of counterparties", including efforts to
ensure counterparties "understand the nature and the risks"

involved in each transaction. The Board's guidance for
State member banks acting as end-users of derivatives

highlights that the end-user is responsible for

understanding and managing the risks involved in its
derivative positions, regardless of any duties the dealer
assumes. Failure to do so,

through lack of internal

expertise or inadequate outside advice, constitutes an
unsafe and unsound banking practice 475

.

For example,

in

actively overseeing the bank's derivative activities,
directors should understand credit, market, and liquidity
risks facing the bank as a whole and its derivative

positions in particular. Further, senior management should
fully understand the bank's risk profile, even when

information and risk analyses are obtained from outside
sources, and only under specified conditions should the

bank use risk analyses supplied by their counterparties 476
The OCC and the Federal Reserve guidelines are

subsantively similar in their emphasis on the use of
derivative products as an appropriate risk-management

.
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tool 477

.

One of the most telling features of the regulatory

guidelines is the recognition that derivative activities
can be beneficial to participating banking institutions in

their overall risk-management actvities 478

.

The OCC has

permitted National Banks to engage in financial derivative
activities in accordance with "safe and sound practices," 479
and has put into place substantial regulations dealing with
the use of derivatives. The OCC permits a National Bank to

use derivatives for the following purposes 480

financial risk for its own account;
of funding:

(3)

(2)

:

(1)

to manage

to lower its cost

to exploit arbitrage opportunities across

financial markets; and

(4)

to engage in the trading of,

and

dealing in, derivatives on behalf of customers. Financial

derivatives not only include transactions involving
interest rates, but also include transactions linked to

commodity prices, equity prices, or indexes in which all or
a

portion of the return is linked to either such prices or

an index of such prices 481

.

OCC Banking Circular 277

prescribes extensive guidelines covering derivative
activities,

including rules regarding senior management and

board oversight of derivative activities, credit risk
management, liquidity risk management, and operations and
systems risk management 482

.

a bank' s level of activity,

The OCC bases its guidelines on

taking into account whether the

bank is a dealer, an active position taker, or a limited
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end-user 483

.

Among the highlights of the agency guidelines

are the following 484
1.

:

A primary emphasis on the responsibility of

a

banking institution's board of directors and senior

management to exercise adequate supervision;
2.

An emphasis upon the adequacy of the institution's

internal control and reporting systems with respect to

derivative activities, and the need to identify and measure
financial risks on an individual and consolidated basis,
i.e. the need to capture a bank's consolidated risk

exposures created by derivative activities in conjunction

with other banking activities and exposures;
3.

The bank's responsibility to take steps necessary

to ensure the legal enforceability of derivative contracts

with counterparties, and the advisability of using master
agreements and netting provisions to reduce, to the maximum
extent possible, net counterparty credit and other risks;
4.

The obligation for the bank to maintain adequate

regulatory capital to protect against the risks associated

with these activities. Finally, insured banks also must
comply with the FDIC's guidance which focuses on end-users

derivatives 485

.

It emphasizes that,

regardless of the

counterparty's duties, end-users are responsible for fully

understanding a transaction'

s

derivative instrument and

attendant risks and have the duty to determine the
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suitability and appropriateness of their derivative
transactions. For the most part, the regulatory perspective
on bank derivative activities was that if these instruments

were used for risk-management (as opposed to speculation)
purposes, and if these activities in these instruments were

adequately supervised, they could be useful in financial
institutions' management of their funding, operational and

other banking risks 486

.

The bank regulatory agencies were

principally concerned with issues such as whether such
derivative activities were permissible for the bank (in
other words, was the underlying asset a permissible

acquisition for

a bank)

;

whether appropriate position

limits were established; whether there existed a system for

periodic reporting to senior management on derivative
activities; whether there existed internal monitoring
systems; and whether the bank had implemented appropriate

accounting policies and procedures with respect to
derivative activities 487

.

It seems that,

for the regulators,

the issue today is not whether a bank may take the risk of
an activity but whether the bank manages it acceptably.

3.

Regulat ory Issue s When New Products Are Created

Regulation has always been a major concern when new
products are created. It is often unclear whether a product

Ill

comes under existing regulations, and which agency should

regulate it 488

.

regulations,

concerns are raised about whether an

If the product does not fall under current

unregulated product should be permitted 489

.

For many years

the over-the-counter market, which largely consisted of the

interbank market for foreign currency, was unregulated at
the Federal level 490

.

Most of the participants were banks,

whose activities were monitored by the appropriate bank

regulatory agency. As more over-the-counter products were
created,

concerns were raised, especially by exchanges 491

.

They argued that since these unregulated over-the-counter

products competed with their products, it gave an unfair
advantage to the over-the-counter products 492

.

Indeed,

an

unregulated market has more flexibility to respond to
changing conditions and does not incur the same level of
legal and administrative costs 493

.

As noted earlier, banks

who are dealing derivatives are subject to regulation by
the appropriate bank regulatory authority who will pay

considerable attention to the derivative activities. Banks
are required to maintain capital in proportion to the risk
of their activities. The regulation that applies to new

products depends on the type of derivative instrument and

counterparty involved. In general, the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 apply to

derivatives that have securities as underlying asset 494

.

The
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Securities and Exchange Commission regulates the trades and
the brokers 495

.

Other levels of regulation are imposed by

the Federal Reserve System, which regulates the extension
of margin credit 496 ; the Securities Investor Protection

Corporation, which provides insurance against the failure
of brokerage firms 497 ; and the National Association of

Securities Dealers (NASD)

,

of which most firms involved in

options trading are members 498

.

Many new exchange-traded

option products were introduced in the 1980s, including
options on stock indexes, options on foreign currencies,
and options on futures 499

.

These products created some

confusion as to whether the Securities and Exchange

Commission of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission had
regulatory purview. The options on futures instrument
caused the greatest confusion because it is like an option
and a futures. In an important step in resolving the
matter, the SEC and CFTC reached an agreement whereby the
SEC would regulate options on stocks,

stock indexes, and

foreign currencies while the CFTC would govern options on
all futures contracts 500

.

According to the agreement,

a

CFTC

regulated contract cannot permit delivery of instruments
regulated by the SEC 501

.

Although this agreement was

a

turning point in regulatory cooperation, continued disputes

between the SEC and CFTC characterized the regulatory
environment of the early 1990s 502

.

The Commodities Exchange
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Act of 1936 applies to derivatives that are commodities and
the CFTC

(

Commodity Futures Trading Commission) regulates

futures commissions merchants,

floor brokers and traders.

Futures and commodity options,

including options on

government securities, futures, and stock indices, are

within the jurisdiction of the CFTC 503
securities,

.

Options on

including on common stock and government debt,

options on foreign currency when traded on exchanges, and
stock indices, are within the SEC's jurisdiction 504

4.

.

Regulation in the OTC Market

One of the difficulties in analyzing the regulatory

treatment of OTC derivatives is that the term itself is not

defined in any of the securities laws, including the
governing statute, the Investment Company Act of 1940 505

.

The Over-the-Counter derivatives have presented challenges
in defining the legal relationship between the

counterparties, which is presumed to be arm's-length, and

respective duties of the financial intermediary and enduser. While all futures and many option contracts are

standardized and traded on exchanges subject to the SEC's
or

CFTC

s

jurisdiction, swaps,

forwards, many options

contracts and other derivatives that are individually

negotiated and traded in the OTC market are not subject to
Federal securities or commodities laws, including their
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anti-fraud provisions 506

.

Banks engaging in OTC derivative

transactions are not subject to "know your customer" or

suitability rules of self-regulatory organizations ("SROs")
under the SEC
rules 507

.

s

jurisdiction nor to the CFTC's disclosure

The General Accounting Office

("GAO")

has

identified three major types of OTC derivatives: forwards,
options and swaps 506

.

In the U.S.,

one principal regulation

of OTC derivatives arises out of bank capital adequacy

regulation 509

In addition however,

.

state insurance company

regulators and Federal securities and commodities

regulatory agencies have issued statements and regulations
that affect derivative market participants 510

.

Over the past few years, investment companies incurred

serious losses arising from investments in OTC

derivatives 511

.

Some of the most notable losses involved

swaps and structured notes that lost value as interest
rates moved sharply upward in 1994 512

.

Market data demonstrate that derivative instruments
represent a limited portion of investment companies' total
assets and that investment companies have been only

marginal players in the derivative markets 513

.
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a.

The Regulatory Policy Underlying the Investment

Company Act
Investment companies are financial intermediaries that
sell shares to the public and invest the proceeds in a

diversified portfolio of securities 514

.

Each share sold

represents a proportionate interest in the portfolio of
securities managed by the investment company on behalf of

shareholders 515

the companies'

.

There are different types of

investment companies such as mutual funds and close-end
funds. A mutual fund is an open-end investment company that
is subject to a continuing obligation to redeem its shares

on demand at a price equal to an appropriate share of the

value of its portoflio, which is computed daily at the
close of the market 516

.

Unlike mutual funds, close-end funds

sell shares like any other corporation but usually do not

redeem their shares 517

.

All investment companies are

regulated at the federal level according to the Investment

Company Act of 1940 and subsequent amendments to that
legislation 518

The securities they issue must be registered

.

with the SEC 519

.

The regulatory policy underlying the

Investment Company Act has been that investment companies

generally should be free to fashion their own investment
strategies and objectives with a few restrictions/ as long
as their provide full and accurate disclosure to

investors 520

.

This regulatory approach allows professional
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investment managers to offer their clients a wide choice of

collective investment vehicles

money market funds,

(e.g.,

long-term bond funds, equity funds, growth funds, index
funds,

asset allocation funds)

risk and price volatility 521

b.

covering the spectrum of

.

The Treatment of Derivatives under the Investment

Company Act
The ICI requires every investment company to recite in
its registration statement, which contains the prospectus,

its fundamental investment policies 522

.

The prospectus must

contain language clearly indicating that the investment
company may utilize particular types of derivatives 523

.

The

Securities and Exchange Commission also requires a firm to

disclose in its prospectus the risks of derivative
trading 524

.

The SEC has required,

for example,

that

investment companies disclose that options and futures may
fail as hedging transactions if there is basis risk between
the underlying position and the derivative position 525

.

Additional risk disclosure requirements focus on
revealing the unpredictability of stock prices, interest
rates,

and other economic factors, and the risk that a fund

may not be able to close out its position if a liquid
secondary market does not exist for

a

given derivative 526

.

117

The SEC stated that "if more than five percent of an

investment company'

s

assets are at risk from its

involvement in derivative instruments and derivative-based
transactions"/ the company's prospectus should address,

(i)

the types of derivative transactions in which the company
the characteristics of those

might engage,

(ii)

transactions,

(iii)

be used, and (iv)

the purposes for which derivatives will

the risks posed by such transactions 527

In keeping with the ICI disclosure philosophy

,

.

the SEC

endorsed the idea that funds should be required to quantify
the level of risk in their portfolios 528

.

Improved

disclosure related to derivatives must focus on the
distinct risks that particular types of derivatives might
pose 529

.

The SEC did not impose restrictions on the use of

derivatives by investment companies, concluding that
derivatives are not inherently risky and may actually
reduce portfolio risk in certain circumstances. The ICA
regulation, however,

Section 18

(a)

imposes restrictions on leverage.

of the ICA prohibits a close-end fund from

issuing any class of "senior security" unless immediately

thereafter the fund has an asset coverage of at least
300% 530

.

The SEC considers leverage to be present in any

transaction that may cause

a

fund to have future payment

obligations or risk of loss exceeding its initial
investment 531

.

The SEC has taken the view that the leverage
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restrictions apply to certain derivative transactions that
expose a fund to future contingent payment or delivery

obligations
positions)

(e.g.

532
.

swaps,

futures and short options

Derivatives, under this view, are clearly

within the scope of the ICA'

s

senior security restrictions.

The reason is that these types of derivative

instruments in effect subordinate the shareholders' claims
to the fund's assets to the claims of the fund's

counterparties in the derivative transactions 533

.

Finally,

under the SEC guidelines, mutual funds may not invest more
than 15% of their net assets in '"illiquid assets." 534 The
SEC views an illiquid asset as "any asset which may not be

sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of business

within seven days at approximately the value at which the
mutual fund has valued the investment." 535 This restriction
is designed to ensure that mutual funds maintain sufficient

liquidity to meet their obligations to redeem fund shares
on demand 536

.

Thus,

funds investing in OTC derivatives must

factor these investments into their calculation of overall

portfolio liquidity. Investement companies should generally
assume that OTC derivatives are illiquid, given their

privately negotiated character and their customized
terms 537

.
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THE FAILURE OF BARINGS BANK

1.

The Facts

The oldest British Merchant Bank, Baring Brothers,

collapsed over the weekend of February 25-26,

1995. A 28

year-old employee based in Singapore and trading futures
and options contracts for the Barings group (he traded
futures on the SIMEX

-

Singapore International Monetary

Exchange) had accumulated losses exceeding £860 million 536

.

Barings' capital was £540 million. A rescue effort by the

Bank of England failed: other banks would not lend to
Barings because with derivative contracts still open, the
full extent of Barings' losses could not be fixed 539

March
NV"

5,

the Dutch "Bank Internationale Nederlanden Groep

(ING Bank)

March

won the bid to acquire Barings' securities

it being understood that ING had to assume most

for £1,

evaluated at that time around £660 million 540

debts,

On

.

8,

.

On

the acquisition was approved by the U.K. High

Court and by the Court in the Cayman Islands, where Barings
was incorporated 541

2.

.

The Cau se of the Collapse

What Barings' broker did was holding many billions of

dollars in unhedged positions in futures and options on the
Nikkei 225 stock index (which is an index based on a
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portfolio of 225 stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange)

,

interest rate futures on Japanese Government

bonds and Futures on TOPIX, the index of all equities

traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 542

.

Leeson got into

trouble buying and selling "straddle" futures tied to the
level of Japan's Nikkei 225 stock index,

"betting",

in

that the market level would stay within a certain

effect,

trading range. But on January 17, 1995, an earthquake
struck the city of Kobe, causing the Nikkei to tumble and
Leeson'

s

losses to mount 543

.

In spite of the falling index,

Leeson was confident the market would soon stabilize,

buying thousands of additional derivative contracts in
desperate "double-or-nothing" style bet 544

a

While, on

.

January 1995 he was trading 2,187 contracts, he reported
trading 16,937 contracts one month later 545

.

The Singapore

Authorities asked the Barings bank to justify the large

mushrooming positions. Why so many contracts in a short
period of time? Leeson told the Barings' group that it was
for customers who had called him. But,

in reality,

it was

not. Barings headquarters thought Leeson was arbitraging 546

.

SIMEX seemed to have not limited Barings to some maximum

number of contracts because of Barings reputation and

because it kept meeting the margin calls 547

.

To cover up his

positions within Barings, Leeson represented some as being
for customers and the other as fully hedged 548

.

In early

"
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March 1995, the Singapore government reported evidence that
Barings' broker forged letters to indicate some positions

were for customers 549

.

For fictitious customers, he had to

meet margin calls and to pay commissions. To do so, he used
an account he had set up in 1992 for his own undisclosed

personal trading 550

.

In early 1995,

he funded this account

with receipts from selling options, but the account ran out
of money on January 22 551

.

Leeson then, asked Barings London

for margin money. By this point, Barings must have known of

large proprietary positions, which its senior management

said they thought were hedged 552

.

To fund as much as $900

million in margin calls, Barings turn to banks in the UK,
US and Japan 553

"Ultimately,

.

According to one Singapore trader:

if you want to cover up something,

it is not

that difficult... Derivative positions change all the time

and balance sheets do not give a proper picture of what is

going on. For anyone on the outside to keep track is

virtually impossible.

554

Others appalled that Barings

allowed Leeson both to trade and to manage settlement 555

.

Thanks to the take-over by ING bank the systemic risk and

ripple effect beyond Barings was minor.

3.

The Legitimate Questions

Everyone associated with banking had to have been
stunned by this failure. How could Leeson'

s

exposure have
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gone undiscovered for so long? How were the massive losses

incurred? And why was the true position not notice earlier?
The losses were incurred by reason of unauthorized and

concealed trading activities within BFS (Baring Futures
Singapore)

556
.

The true position was not noticed earlier by

reason of a serious failure of controls and managerial

confusion within Barings, nor had it been detected by the
external auditors, supervisors or regulators of Barings 557

.

How concerned should bank regulators be about the role of

Barings bank in the events leading to the crisis
a

?

Is this

matter of better prudential regulation or does it suggest

that deposit -taking institutions should be separated from

securities and derivative activities? Debate rages between
those worried about the systemic dangers posed by

derivative markets and those who ridicule the worriers.

Many people, including the US congressmen, believe the
problem is big 556

.

The complexity eludes the senior managers

who are supposed to evaluate the systems and the risks, but

must instead rely on traders themselves, exposing the firm
to possible fraud 559

.

On Friday, December

1,

1995, Nick

Leeson pleaded guilty to two offenses of deceiving the
auditors of Barings in a way likely to cause harm to their

reputation and to cheating SIMEX 560
Saturday December

2,

.

The following day,

Nick Leeson was sentenced to six and a

half years in prison 561

.

He is currently serving his
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sentence in Changi, Singapore. The collapse of Barings is
one of the most spectacular debacles in modern financial

history. If a kid, playing on the other side of the world,

could destroy a 240 year-old bank that had financed the

Napoleonic Wars and that counted the Queen among its
current clients, how safe are investors and depositors

anywhere? The Barings broker dealt with losses and avoided
detection. The story reveals an amazing chain of human
errors. This crisis raises important issues concerning the

regulation of futures and options markets. Not only
derivatives were the cause of the collapse but also
mismanagement,

fraud or conspiracy were involved in this

case. Right or wrong,

one conclusion that could be drawn

without any doubt is that those who sat on the board of
Barings emerge from this story as sublime incompetents for
not having exercised the minimum duty of care that they

should have exercised.
This story points certainly to the core issue in an
age of derivatives and Electronic finance or

"cyberbanking", i.e, the ability of banks and non-bank

entities to gather, transfer, store money through

mechanisms outside of the bank regulatory framework. Can
the bank regulatory structure rely for the protection of

the system on internal controls and the conscientiousness
of bankers to control these risks,

incurred at these
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speeds? And what if it cannot? And can it rely on them for
the protection of the federal deposit insurance funds?

Unfortunately, Barings' case is not the only one. This
year,

a

Japanese company, the Sumitomo Corp.,

a

top general

trade house, reported losses totaling $1.8 billion from its
top traders'

trading of physical copper and copper-related

derivative instruments over ten years 562

E.

RECENT LITIGATION CASES

-

.

ON TRIAL FOR DANGEROUS

DEALING

1.

Introduction

While there have been numerous reports of losses,

which illustrate problems with internal control and risk
management, the most significant litigation so far has

raised suitability questions. Additionally, in numerous
cases,

the excessive losses occurred when investment

strategies utilized derivatives to "bet" that interest
rates would stay low. When interest rates began to rise,

these strategies failed. Since the dealers of derivatives
is,

in most instances,

the more sophisticated party with

respect to the function of risks associated with
derivatives, it is the investor who is often left out of
the loop when it comes to understanding derivative

transactions 563

.

It is for this reason - the lack of

s
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sophistication of the consumer

-

that disclosure of

derivatives related risks by dealers is so important. At
present, there are no mandatory regulatory or industry

standards requiring dealers to evaluate their customer'

capacity to understand the risks inherent in the use of
derivatives in an investment portfolio 564

.

As a result, many

customers invest funds with little understanding of what

derivatives are and how they work. Moreover, in the case of
the individual putting private money in a purportedly safe

investment, such as money market or mutual fund, there may

be no knowledge that fund managers are even using

derivatives 565

2.

.

Suitabi lity duties imposed on broker-dealers

In general,

a

broker-dealer may recommend a security

to a retail customer only if the broker-dealer obtains

information regarding the customer's financial

circumstances and investment objectives and, on the basis
of this information,

determines that the security is

suitable for the customer 566

.

Suitability rules are

enforceable against members of Self Regulatory

Organizations through censure, fines, suspension,
expulsion, and other disciplinary sanctions available under
rules of Self Regulatory Organizations 567

.

A broker-dealer's

violation of the NYSE's "Know your customer" rule or the
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NASD'

s

suitability rule generally will not entitle the

customer to bring a civil claim for damages against that

broker-dealer 568

.

However, violations of the NASD and NYSE

rules may be actionable under the anti-fraud provisions of

Federal or State securities laws 569

section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 570
the

SEC

s

Rule 10b-5 571

,

a

For instance, under

.

,

implemented through

customer may recover damages of

the broker-dealer engaged in fraudulent sales practices in

connection with the unsuitable transaction, such as making
a

material misrepresentation or omission with respect to a

security that the broker-dealer knew or, but for his or her
reckless conduct, would have known, was unsuitable for the

customer 572

.

There is no common law cause of action for

broker-dealer's failure to make

a

a

suitability determination

absent an advisory agreement or assumption by the broker-

dealer of duties to the customer other than merely taking
orders 573

.

Without an advisory agreement as

breach of contract claim, when

a

a

basis for a

special relationship of

trust and confidence exists between the broker-dealer and
the customer,

the broker's investment in unsuitable

securities for the customer may constitute a breach of

fiduciary duty or negligence 574

.

In the banking area, banking regulators have imposed

less stringent requirements on the basis that most bank

derivative dealers have institutional customers that do not
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need retail customer protection. The OCC require only that
before entering into any derivative transaction with a
customer, a bank determine whether the proposed transaction
is consistent with the customer' s policies and procedures

with respect to derivative activities, as they are known to
the bank. An examination of some of the more prominent

derivatives-related debacles follows.

The Bankers Trust Case

a.

The Bankers Trust settlements arose from a series of

leveraged interest rate swaps that BT entered into with

Gibson Greetings Inc. and Procter

Gamble from 1991 to

&

1993. An interest rate swap is an agreement by two

"counterparties" to pay each other the amount of interest
each owes on a specified amount, called the "notional

amount 575

.

"

Typically, one counterparty must make floating

interest rate payments, while the other is required to make
fixed payments. In the Procter

&

Gamble case, one contract

was a so called 5-30 swap, under which Procter

&

Gamble was

to pay a fixed rate tied to the five-year US Treasury note

and the 30-year Treasury bond and receive a floating rate

tied to the commercial paper rate 576

.

The second swap, a so-

called Deutschemark swap, was tied to German interest
rates 577

.

Many of the BT's swaps were leveraged so that the

swaps' value changed dramatically with relatively small
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changes in market interest rates. They also were over-the-

counter derivatives that were customized, privately

negotiated and not traded on any market. BT, like most
derivative dealers, guarded its assumptions and

methodologies for valuing swaps linked to interest rates
and other indices as proprietary trade secrets 578

interest rates rose in 1993, Procter

&

When

.

Gamble's and

Gibson's leveraged swaps plummeted in value and both

terminated their swap agreement and separately brought suit
against BT 579

Both companies claimed that they lacked

.

access to BT'

s

computer models for predicting interest rate

changes, which BT regarded as proprietary. They also

claimed that they could not evaluate their derivative
holdings and alleged that BT had misrepresented materially
the risks attendant to investing in derivatives 580

.

After these suits were filed, the Federal Reserve, the
CFTC and the SEC commenced separate investigations of BT.
In December 1994,

the Federal Reserve announced a

settlement with BT, requiring the company to disclose to

leveraged derivative customers, among other things, "the

methodology for making valuation adjustments'' and "the
analytical foundation for the valuation adjustment

methodology. 581 " Two weeks later, the SEC and CFTC issued
their own settlement orders with BT. BT did not admit to

any fraud, but the orders stated that BT had violated
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statutory reporting and anti-fraud provisions in connection
with the Gibson swaps and required BT to "cease and desist"

violating the commodities and securities laws 582
today,

.

Until

federal regulators have avoided establishing

suitability policy for derivatives but by reciting that
BT' s alleged misconduct consisted of making material

misrepresentations and omissions, the CFTC and SEC
settlements may presage the regulators' use of a previously

unrecognized theory of liability 583

.

Also it has left the

market somewhat concerned as to whether it acts as a

precedent 584

.

Those new rules will probably prompt all

reporting companies using derivatives to disclose their
current market values. Such rules could put more pressure
on derivative dealers not only to perform the valuation

function for their clients, but also to describe the

assumptions and methodologies behind the valuations. The
CFTC and SEC ordered Bankers Trust recently to pay a $10

million fine to settle securities and commodities law
violations based on misrepresentation and omissions made to
Gibson Greetings 585

.

The CFTC agreement also established

that BT "became a commodity trading advisor" with a

fiduciary obligation to Gibson 586

.
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The Procter

b.

Procter

&

Gamble Case

&

Gamble sued Bankers Trust because they had

suffered heavy losses due to unsuitable trades in Swaps.
The law suit which was filed in 1994 had asked the District

Court of Ohio to declare a swap transaction void, and had
sought $130 million in compensatory damages against Bankers
Trust 587

Procter

.

&

Gamble had also asked for an unspecified

amount of punitive damages. Procter

&

Gamble had charged

that Bankers Trust did not fully and accurately disclose

information on the terms and risks of an interest-rate swap

designed for Procter
Procter

&

&

Gamble 588

.

Bankers Trust claimed that

Gamble losses came because of market risks that

the company knowingly took through a transaction that it

fully understood and approved 589

.

The suit charges in part

that the consumer product giant relied on BT as a fiduciary

advisor for complex derivatives 590

Procter

&

.

Bankers Trust and

Gamble Co. reached on May

9,

1996 an agreement

settling a two-year-old dispute between the two
companies 591

c.

.

Orange County Case

Municipalities an other investors of public funds are
also subject to investor risk when derivatives are used.

Local boards are often composed of prominent citizens who,

though well respected in their community, lack the
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financial expertise needed to properly manage risk 59 -. Nor
are pension fund boards or municipalities likely to have

access to the sophisticated computer hardware and software

dealers employ to evaluate risk 593

.

Compounding these

investment risks is the pressure for fund managers to show
an impressive return on investment 594

.

This pressure leads

fund managers to move toward increasingly riskier and less
well understood investments and the result, as witnessed

recently in Orange County/ may be disastrous 595

.

In December

of 1994, Orange County, California sent shock waves through

the U.S. financial markets. With its $7.4 billion

investment fund facing losses of $1.5 billion/ the county
filed for bankruptcy, the largest such filing ever by a

municipality 596

.

Under the supervision of County Treasurer

Robert L. Citron, the County's funds were used in a highly

leveraged investment strategy that attempted to use

interest-sensitive derivative contracts to boost the funds
yield 597

.

In the beginning,

Citron's fund, which offered a

return of between seven and eight percent annually, was an

attractive investment to recession-ridden local governments
and public entities whose primary alternative was a

conservative state-run fund paying around four percent per
year 598

.

Taking in approximately $7.5 billion from nearly

200 local governments and agencies, Citron then borrowed

aggressively, bringing the value of the investment pool to
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$20 billion 599

This money was then invested in volatile

.

structured notes issued by quasi-governmental agencies like
the Federal National Mortgage Association

and

(FNMA)

Federal Home Loan Banks, which effectively leveraged the

entire pool by a factor of three 600

.

Citron planned to earn

around five percent in his base investment, and secure an

enhanced yield on the leveraged portion of the fund (around
$

14 billion)

based on the difference between what the

bonds paid (five percent) and the cost of financing them
(three percent)

601
.

Unfortunately for Citron, his strategy

relied on a bet that interest would stay low; most of the
funds derivatives were inverse floaters,

instruments whose

yields move counter to market interest rates 602

.

The

strategy paid well while rates remained low, but when rates
climbed, Citron's portfolio began to earn below market
rates,

forcing Citron to pay more on the money he had

borrowed than his fund could now earn 603

.

When the Federal

Reserve raised the discount rate, Citron's pool could no
longer sustain the cost of the leveraged portion of its
fund,

and shortly thereafter the county filed for

bankruptcy protection 604

.

In aftermath of the collapse,

critics have blamed Citron'

s

some

management strategy and lack

of expertise rather than the financial instruments used 605

.

Other commentators have claimed that the lesson of the
Orange County debacle is not that a fund manager used risky
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derivatives to boost investment earnings, but rather that
public funds, which were thought by most county taxpayers
to be invested conservatively,

were in fact being put at

great risk in speculative trading 006

d.

.

Metallgesellschaft case

One of the highest profile derivatives-induced

disasters occurred at Metallgesellschaft, Germany's

fourteenth-largest industrial corporation, whose subsidiary
MG Corp. had estimated losses for 1993 of at least $500

million 607

.

Over the course of several years, MG entered

into a series of long-term,

fixed-price contracts, agreeing

to supply petroleum products to various counterparties 608

The subsidiary failed, however,

.

to negotiate agreements to

buy oil products in an amount sufficient to fulfill the
supply contracts, leaving the subsidiary vulnerable to
fluctuations in the price of oil for at least some portion
of the amount of product it had contracted to supply to its

counterparties 609

.

MG then purchased oil derivatives

contracts both on the OTC market and through organized
exchanges, the strategy being that an expected rise in the

price of oil would create profits through the derivatives

which would offset the losses MG would take buying high-

priced oil to fulfill its supply contract obligations 610

.

134

Unfortunately, the attempted hedge was improperly
planned,

and the derivatives MG purchased were suitable

hedges only for short-term oil price fluctuations 611

.

When

the spread between the long and short-term price of oil

increased, the derivatives MG purchased as protection ended
up costing the company a very big loss 612

.

,

CHAPTER VIII:
CURRENT U.S. BANK SUPERVISORY INITIATIVES:
HOW TO LASSO THE DERIVATIVE BEAST?

A.

CHANGING FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The events of the past several years, have

qualitatively changed the level of regulatory interest in
derivative activities, as commercial banks have become

primarily (if not principal) participants in the domestic
and international swaps,

derivatives markets 613

futures,

options and other

This increase in participation,

.

coupled with the fact that there is no organized regulatory
structure for many of the most active derivative markets,
have led to calls by Congress and some of the regulatory
agencies,
(SEC)

including the Securities and Exchange Commission

and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)

for assurances that bank involvement in these markets is

prudent and consistent with the interests of other market
participants, and does not unduly jeopardize bank

depositors interests 614

.

Because derivative activities are

not subject to consolidated supervision and regulation, and
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because they take place in a variety of exchange and OTC

market environments, the concerns over the potential risks

associated with these markets has been tempered by the
recognition that any attempt to regulate these markets in

a

consolidated fashion may interfere with their efficient
functioning and deprive participants of their important

risk-management benefits 615

.

B.

PROPOSED REGULATION OF BANKS' DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES

1.

New Requirements Adopted by the Federal Reserve,

the QCC and the FDIC

Although banking regulators are aware that additional
regulation is required in order to reduce risk exposure in
derivatives, they have urged Congress not to further

regulate derivative activities 616

.

Indeed,

regulators fear

that increased regulation "could be more hurtful than

helpful." 617 The regulatory response to the increased use of
derivatives by banks has been moderate. Instead of

prohibiting or restricting banks' use of derivatives,
banking regulators have responded by amending their risk
based capital standards to ensure that banks engaging in
derivative activities have sufficent capital 618

.

The new

requirements are based upon the July 15, 1994 proposed
revisions to the Agreement on International Convergence of
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Capital Measurement and Capital Standards of July 1988
("Basle Accord")

Reserve Board 620

Currency 621

,

,

619

and have been adopted by the Federal

the Office of the Comptroller of the

the Office of Thrift Supervision 622 and the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 623
banks,

state member banks,

.

Thus,

national

state non-member banks and bank

holding companies will all be subject to essentially the
same regulations 624

.

The changes will be twofold: they will

amend risk based capital standards to account for off-

balance-sheet items such as derivatives and they will
recognize bilateral agreements for purposes of such

accounting 625

a.

.

Proposed Changes to Risk Based Capital Standards

As mentioned earlier, risk based capital standards

prescribe the amount of capital that banks must hold
depending upon the risks embodied in their assets and off-

balance-sheet items 626

.

The proposed rules account for

derivatives by converting them into credit equivalent
amounts, multiplying the credit equivalent amount by a

weighting factor (which presumably would depend on the
creditworthiness of the obligor), and increasing the bank's
capital requirements by the product 627

.

The credit

equivalent of an off-balance-sheet derivative is the sum of
two components: a bank's current exposure and its potential

138

exposure 626

.

The current exposure is closely related to the

market value of
enters into

a

derivative 625

.

For example,

A

if Bank

derivative agreement with Bank B in which

a

Bank B owes Bank A $100,000, Bank A'

s

current exposure is

$100,000 because it is the amount that Bank A would lose if
Bank B defaulted. Bank

B,

on the other, would not have any

current exposure because it loses nothing if Bank A
defaults. Potential exposure is calculated by multiplying
the notional principal amount of the underlying contract by
a

conversion factor 630

The conversion factor derives its

.

value from two components: the type of contract and

duration of the contract 631

.

The first component of the

conversion factors is the asset underlying
contract 632

.

conversion factors:
(3)

derivative

The new regulations create five categories of

derivative contracts 633

rate;

a

gold;

commodities 634

(4)

(1)

.

There are, in order of increasing

interest rate;

(2)

foreign exchange

equity precious metal and

other

(5)

Interest rate derivatives have been assigned

.

to the lowest conversion factors,

and thus, are subject to

the lower capital requirements; derivatives based on "other
commodities'' have been assigned the highest conversion

factors and thus, are subject to the highest capital

requirements 635

.

The second component of the conversion

factor is the length of the derivative contract 636

.

Longer

contracts are subject to higher conversion factors 637

.

Thus,
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a

derivative contract with

remaining maturity of one year

a

will be subject to lower conversion factors than

corresponding contract with

a

a

maturity over five years 638

.

After determining the appropriate conversion factor,
the bank or regulator may calculate the potential exposure
of a derivative contract by multiplying the notional value

of the contract by the conversion factor 639

.

The credit

equivalent amount of a derivative contract is the sum of
its current exposure and its potential exposure 640

.

Once the

credit equivalent amount is calculated, capital adequacy

requirements are derived by multiplying the credit
equivalent amount by the weighting factor assigned to the

counterparty 641

The Federal Reserve,

.

in conjunction with

the OCC and FDIC adopted a rule effective September

1995

1,

that revises the risk-based capital guidelines to include

explicit consideration of bank's exposure to declines in
the economic value of their capital due to changes in

interest-rate 642

.

The guidelines will now act to ensure that

banks have sufficient capital on hand to cover potential
losses incurred due to interest-rate risk exposure. The
final rule does not establish thresholds above which a

bank's interest-rate exposure is considered too high 643

.
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b.

Recognition of Bilateral Netting Agreements

Bilateral netting agreement is an agreement under

which two parties who have entered into multiple
transactions agree to satisfy their obligations to each
other on an aggregated basis, netting out the respective

amounts owed to each other in the various transactions 644

.

Although, netting typically occurs in the designated

payment date, it may occur during a "close

out''.

Market

values are netted to calculate a single net termination
amount 645

.

Because the use of netting in the context of a

close-out is not recognized as legally enforceable under
the bankruptcy laws of all countries,

there exists a risk

that a counterparty may be unable to net market values at

termination. As long as netting at close-out is not

recognized as legally enforceable, capital adequacy based
on a net position would underestimate the credit exposure
of the banking organization counterparty of the

derivative 646

.

If netting is recognized as legally

enforceable at close-out, then banking organization that
are parties to netting agreements can maintain capital

based on their net rather than gross position. The proposed
rules would recognize bilateral netting agreements for

purposes of risk-based capital standards, potentially
reducing the current exposure of banks that have entered
into multiple derivative transactions with a single
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"

counterparty 64

7

.

To illustrate

,

assume that Bank A and Bank

B enter into five derivative contracts with each other.

Bank A owes Bank B $100,000 on contract one, $100,000 on
contract two, and $100,000 on contract three. Bank B owes

Bank A $100,000 on contract four and $100,000 on contract
five. Before bilateral netting agreements were recognized,

Bank A would have a current exposure of $200,000

(the

amount that Bank A would lose if Bank B defaulted)

and Bank

B would have a current exposure of $300,000. Bilateral

netting agreements allow banks to net out their differences

with

a

counterparty 646

.

Thus,

under the proposed rule, Bank

B would have a current exposure of $100,000 and Bank A

would have no current exposure. In order to qualify for
special treatment, a bank must show that it has a legally

enforceable bilateral netting agreement 649

.

Under such an

agreement, the market value of all derivative contracts

among the parties are added together to produce one net

current exposure 650

.

This protects a party that has not

defaulted against

a

party that has defaulted. To

illustrate,

suppose that Bank A files bankruptcy. Bank A

would refuse to pay Bank B yet it could demand that Bank B
pay it under the contracts. Under such

a

scenario, Bank B

would have to pay Bank A $200,000 while also suffering

a

total loss of $300,000 on the other contract with Bank A.
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be required to pay Bank A anything. Proof of a legally

enforceable bilateral agreement would be made by obtaining
a

written legal opinion certifying the validity of the

opinion 651

.

In addition to these changes,

the regulatory

agencies issued special guidelines addressing the concerns

related to derivative instruments. The Federal Reserve, in

conjunction with the OCC and FDIC, has recently amended its
risk-based capital guidelines for State Member banks 652 and
Bank Holding Companies 653 to recognize for derivative

contracts the effects of netting arrangements in the

calculation of potential future risk exposure. The only

netting agreement recognized by the Capital Adequacy
Guidelines is netting by novation 654

.

Netting by novation

involves a contract under which all obligations between the
same two parties for the same currency and value date are
combined, with the result that one single net amount is

legally substituted for all of the previous obligations 655

.

Netting by novation is recognized because it is the only
form of netting the Basle Supervisors' Committee determined
to be legally enforceable under bankruptcy laws of all

members countries. Under the amendments, institutions are

required to have reasoned legal opinions concluding that
bilateral netting agreements are legally enforceable in all
relevant jurisdictions 656

.

As a result, banks using eligible
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derivatives are allowed to hold less capital against future
credit exposure.

2.
a.

Guidelines Issued by the Federal Regulatory Agencies
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System
The Federal Reserve issued guidelines for examiners on

"Examining Risk Management and Internal Controls for
Trading Activities of Banking Organizations" 657 and the
Capital Markets and Trading Activities Manual 658

.

The

Trading Activities Examiner Guidelines, which parallel

provisions of the Trading Activities Manual, target
trading, market-making, and customer-accommodation

activities in cash and derivative instruments at State

member banks, branches and agencies of foreign banks, and
Edge corporations 659

.

Principles of the Trading Activities

Examiner Guidelines also apply to risk management of bank

holding companies on a consolidated basis and can be
applied to banks' use of derivatives as end-users when
appropriate. Also, the Federal Reserve issued complementary

examiner guidelines, specifically applicable to these
institutions' end-user derivative activities, entitled

"Evaluating the Risk Management and Internal Controls of
Securities and Derivative Contracts Used in Nontrading

Activities," 660

.

Most recently, the Federal Reserve also
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issued examiner guidelines entitled "Rating the Adequacy of

Risk Management Processes and Internal Controls at State

Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies.'' 661 The following
summary is of significant provisions of both the Trading
and Nontrading Activities Examiner Guidelines related to

derivative activities.

a.l)

Trading Activities Examiner Guidelines and

Trading Activities Manual
a.l) a- Provisions on customer appropriateness:

the

purpose of the provisions is to protect the bank from
credit risk, legal risk and risk of loss of its

reputation 662

In this regard,

.

a

bank must ensure that the

counterparty has sufficient authority to enter into

a

derivatives transaction. In order to determine whether or
not a company, a municipality do have the statutory

authority to enter into these transactions, the bank should
look to authorizations of boards of directors or

trustees 663

.

Also the bank must take steps to ascertain the

character and financial sophistication of the counterparty,
including ensuring that the counterparty understands the
nature of and the risks inherent in the agreed

transaction 664

.

If the counterparty is unsophisticated,

bank must take additional steps to ensure that the

counterparty is made aware of attendant risks 665

.

In its

the
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evaluation of the counterparty's creditworthiness, the bank
should consider, in addition to the counterparty'

s

overall

financial strength and ability to perform on its
obligation, the counterparty's ability to understand and

manage the risks inherent in a derivative product 666

.

a.l)b- Provisions on netting agreements: the banks

should have guidelines and rules in place to determine

enforceability of netting agreements before consummating
transaction 667

.

a

Banks should determine the enforceability of

netting agreements in all relevant jurisdictions,

notwithstanding the counterparty's insolvency 668

.

a.l)c- Provisions on board of directors and management
oversight: Risk-taking activities of an institution should
be governed by policies approved by the board of directors.

The board of directors regularly should be informed of risk

exposure an risk management issues 669

.

Further,

senior

management should oversee trading operations and ensure
that relevant policies and procedures are adequate. In

addition,

in order to avoid fraud or conspiracy, management

must create a risk management function that is fully

independent of trading management 670

.

The objective is to

ensure that the board of directors provides the policies
and guidance and exercises the overall supervision
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requisite to management's operation of the bank's

derivatives business effectively and in

a

safe and sound

manner, while leaving to management responsibility for day-

to-day operations and operational oversight 671

.

The risk

management function should report trading risks, profits,
and losses at least daily to managers who supervise but do
not conduct themselves trading activities 672

.

The personnel

staffing this function should understand the risks

associated with derivatives and their compensation should
not be tied too closely to the profitability of trading,

in

order to avoid potential incentives for excessive risk-

taking 673

.

a.l)d- Provisions on risk management
-

Accounting issues: Banks should have the ability to

mark-to-market derivatives and all other trading position
on a daily basis 674

obtained,

As long as reliable market value can be

.

it is possible to simply record the transaction

as either an asset or liability 675

.

Mark-to-market

accounting has long been used by banks, investment firms,
and mutual funds to value their securities portfolios.
In Japan,

after the Sumitomo loss in 1996, the

Ministry of Finance decided to require that banks and
securities companies start using the mark-to-market

accounting method 676

.

Currently, the non financial Japanese
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companies can use the lower-cost accounting method which
enables a company to book its asset values at the time of
purchase, regardless of current or real value of such
the asset's value will be either

assets. With this method,

what the firm paid for it or what it is currently worth on
the market, whichever is lower 677

.

The trouble with this

method, which Sumitomo and other Japanese firms that

suffered losses are believed to have used, is that it does
not reflect real losses until the company disposes of the

assets in question 678

.

A third method, sometimes used in

accounting for derivatives, is hedge accounting. This

method can be used for contracts in which the derivative is
specifically entered into to protect the price of another
asset, which is either held or anticipated for purchase or

sale 679

.

All profits from the contract are simply recognized

as being part of the purchase or sale price of the

underlying hedged asset 680
-

.

Banks should monitor credit exposures, market risk

exposures, trading positions, and market movements at least
daily. Banks should calculate market risk exposures at

least daily using a measure such as value-at-risk 681

.

Value-

at-risk measures potential gain or loss in a position,
portfolio, or institution that is associated with a price

movement of a given probability over

horizon 682

.

a

specified time

Stress tests should be quantitative analyses,
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such as contingency plans 683

.

Analyses of stress situations

should assess not only the probability of adverse events,
but also address plausible "worst case" scenarios on an

institution-wide basis, which consider the effect of
unusual price changes or default of

a

large counterparty

across both derivatives and cash trading portfolios. What

A stress test should

is the purpose of the stress test?

demonstrate to

a

bank where it may have too much exposure

in a particular risk dimension or, with respect to a

particular counterparty, where it may be relying on assumed
relationships between prices, volatility, or liquidity
conditions that could break down 684

.

The stress test should

help the bank identify genuine potential threats and how
banks might manage themselves in these scenarios.
Furthermore, a system of integrated,

institution-wide

limits and risk-taking guidelines should set boundaries for

risk-taking activities and ensure that positions that
exceed predetermined levels receive prompt management
action 685

.

So,

there should be global limits for each types

of risks. Banks with significant trading and derivative

activities should internally review methods of risk

measurement at least annually 686
traded,

control,

.

Before a new product is

senior management, risk management, internal
legal accounting, auditing, and traders should

understand it, develop appropriate policies and controls,
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and integrate the product into risk measurement and control

systems 687

.

More recently, regarding capital requirements,

the Federal Reserve announced a new approach

,

the so-

called "pre- commitment approach", which means that each

bank would state the maximum loss that its trading book
will sustain over,
bank,

say,

the next three months 688

.

So the

in effect, pre-commits to a maximum loss level.

Their

capital charge for market risk equals the pre-committed

maximum loss level and if the bank'
level,

a

s

losses exceed this

significant penalty is imposed 689

.

While pre-

commitment has received mixed reviews from the banking

industry it carries three advantages. First, it means that
banks can choose to control risk through higher capital
levels or by use of sophisticated dynamic hedging

strategies 690

.

Second, pre-commitment also gives banks an

incentive to use the most sophisticated methods for

assessing portfolio risk and improve their risk assessment
technologies 691

.

Finally,

the approach saves regulators from

imposing some type of basic, one-size-fits-all model of

portfolio risk on their clients for setting regulatory
capital 692

.

Instead,

they need only to verify that the

bank' s risk management structure is in place and is

adequate. It is also less burdensome and intrusive on banks

than other options.

s
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2.

Nontradina Activities Examiner Guidelines

a.

Provisions on Board of Directors and Senior

Management Oversight
The Nontrading Activities Examiner Guidelines also

call for active oversight of end-user derivative activities

by the board of directors and senior management of banks 693
In general,

the familiarity,

.

technical knowledge, and

awareness of directors and senior management should be

commensurate with the level and nature of the bank'

derivative positions 694

.

Senior management should ensure

that there are adequate policies and procedures for

conducting nontrading derivative activities on

a

long-range

and day-to-day basis. These policies and procedures include

clear lines of authority and responsibility for acquiring

instruments and managing risk, appropriate limits on risktaking,

adequate systems for measuring risk, acceptance

standards for valuing positions and measuring performance,

effective internal controls, and

a

comprehensive risk

reporting and management review process 695

b.

.

Provisions on Written Policies and Procedures

Written policies and procedures should clearly outline
the bank's approach to management of end-user derivative

activities. Such policies should be consistent with the
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bank's broader business strategies, capital adequacy,
technical expertise, and risk appetite 696

c.

.

Provisions on Risk Measurement

Regardless of any responsability, legal or otherwise,
assumed by the dealer, a bank acting as end-user ultimately
is responsible for understanding and managing risks posed

by its derivative transactions 697

3.

.

Risk Management Examiner Guidelines

In November 1995,

the Federal Reserve issued the "Risk

Management Examiner Guidelines'". The risk management
examiner guidelines are intended to assist examiners in
their evaluation of risk management controls. Examiners are
to give them considerable weight in their overall

evaluation of an institution's management 698

.

The management

rating will be an important factor in determining an

institution's CAMEL supervisory rating 699 The main
.

principles resulting from these guidelines are the
following 700
-

:

the board of directors is responsible for the level

of risk taken by the bank and it should approve all

strategies for risk taking activities;
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-

the board of directors and senior management must

identify and measure all material risk exposures and tailor
risk management policies and procedures to the risks taken;
-

the safe and sound functioning of the institution

must be established and maintained by internals controls
and separation of duties.

b.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

A new Banking Circular 701 called "Risk Management of
Financial Derivatives" or Bank Circurlar 277 from October
1993 provides guidance to national banks,

and Federally

licensed branches and agencies of foreign banks that engage
in derivative activities. These provisions focus

principally on OTC derivatives but are for the most part
substantively similar to those issued by the Federal
Reserve. They emphasizes on the use of derivatives as an

appropriate risk management tool. Circular 277 offers
specific guidance on market, credit, liquidity, operations,
and system risk management and measurement.

The OCC

believes that the best defense against sizeable individual
losses or significant systemic disruptions is the

implementation and use by individual banks of sound and
efficient risk management processes 702

.

With respect to risk

measurement, Circular 277 provides that a bank active in

derivative transactions should have

a

system to determine
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potential credit risk 703

.

According to the Circular,

bank

a

may engage in the hedging of physical commodity derivatives
with physical commodities only under the following
conditions 704
-

:

the commodities transactions supplement and

constitute a nominal percentage of the bank's risk

management activities;
-

the commodities transactions are used to hedge

otherwise permissible, customer-driven banking activities;
-

the commodities transactions are not entered into

for speculative purposes and prior to entering into

commodities transactions, the bank's board of directors and
the OCC should have approved a detailed plan for the

hedging activity. However, derivative transactions with
respect to bank-eligible precious metals

platinum

)

(gold,

silver and

are not subject to this latest provision 705

.

The

OCC did not adopt a suitability standard for bank

derivative activities in its circular. The suitability
guidelines in Circular 277 generally do not apply to a
bank'

s

transaction with other dealers or sophisticated

market participants, nor do they require banks to request
specific information or make a judgment about suitability

before recommending

a

transaction 706

.

Circular 277 presumes,

consistent with safe and sound banking practices, that a

bank dealer will not recommend transactions it knows, or

"
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has reason to know, would be inappropriate for the customer
on the basis of available information. Although a bank

would not be prohibited from executing

a

transaction it

believes to be inappropriate for a customer, it must advise
the customer of this determination,

document it, and

consider the customer's ability to perform the contract in

making

a

credit decision 707

on May 10,

.

The OCC also issued a circular

1994 that further described responsibilities of

banks engaged in derivative transactions 708

.

This circular

was designed to answer questions raised by the prior

circular on this subject 709

.

Of particular concern to banks

was the scope of the requirement for determining the

appropriateness of derivatives for bank customers 710

.

Further, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency has proposed

many ways to strengthen the way national banks manage their
derivative risks. One proposal is to have

a unit,

independent of the traders, that carefully monitors the
trader's investments. The Comptroller acknowledges that the
internal systems used by the biggest banks are more

sophisticated than those it is considering 711
26,

1995 in News Release,

.

On September

the OCC announced plans to

implement a revised system under which its examiners will

evaluate risk in national banks 712

.

Under the new system, called "supervision by risk,
the OCC examiners will use newly defined,

specific
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categories of risk to assess risk exposure 713

The goal of

.

the supervision by risk is to evaluate the quantity of risk

exposure and determine the quality of risk management
systems in place to control that risk. The OCC will use
risk as an organizing principle for all safety and

soundness supervision 714

.

Supervision by risk reflects

a

judgment by the OCC that risk assessment must be more fully
and evenly incorporated into bank supervision. Therefore,
the identified nine risks will be treated the same

throughout all national banks, all products, and all
activities. The nine identified risks are:
(2)

interest rate risk;

risk;

(5)

(3)

liquidity risk;

foreign exchange risk;

compliance risk;

(8)

(1)

(6)

price

transaction risk

strategic risk; and

risk. Under supervision by risk,

(4)

credit risk;

(9)

(7)

reputation

examiners will make and

record judgments of risk exposure and the ability of the

particular national bank to manage that risk exposure 715

.

Examiners will then, prepare a summary that measures the
national bank's aggregate risk judgment and determines the
areas of potential future risk 716

.

Examinations will no

longer be focused by a transactional approach or an

approach based upon product line. The OCC has already

implemented part of the proposed supervision by risk 717

.
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

c.

The goal of the FDIC guidelines is to ensure that

appropriate capital levels, expertise and management
controls are maintained by insured banks engaging in

derivatives 718

.

These guidelines focus on the examination of

institutions that are end-users of derivatives 719

.

FDIC reviews mainly the risks associated with derivatives.
The Guidelines state for example,

that banks are

responsible for fully understanding a transaction's

derivative instrument and the associated risks 720

.

A end-

user bank has the duty to determine the suitability and

appropriateness of its involvement with an activity. The
guidelines also highlight that examiners should identify
and review in detail institutions that appear to be

speculating by taking unhedged or unmatched positions in

anticipation that future price movements will be
advantageous.

State Agencies

3.

No state appears to have enacted express statutory

authority permitting a State Bank to engage in financial
derivative transactions to the same extent as National
Banks 721

.

The Kansas Attorney General,

opined that

a

for example,

has

Kansas State Bank does not have the power to

enter into financial derivative transactions 722

.

At least
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two states expressly authorize derivative activities to

some extent 723

The bank regulatory authority for New York

.

has authorized several different types of derivative

activities 724

Illinois appears to have recognized an

.

incidental power for its State Banks to hedge their

interest rate risk through the use of interest rate swaps
and similar instruments 725 Failure to authorize the use of
.

financial derivatives for State Banks could deprive them of
an important tool for managing interest risk or of the

opportunity to generate additional revenue.

4.

The Derivatives Policy Group'

s

:

Framework for

Voluntary Oversight
Representatives of broker-dealers with affiliates that
are major OTC derivatives market participants, with the

cooperation of the SEC and CFTC, have joined under the
Derivatives Policy Group in an effort to define

a

voluntary

oversight framework for the OTC derivatives activities of

unregulated securities firm affiliates of SEC-registered
broker-dealers and CFTC-registered Futures Commission

merchants 726

.

The purpose is to define the relationship

among participants in the OTC financial markets and to

articulate

a set of

sound practices to be followed in

connection with OTC financial market transactions among

participants 727

.

The framework and principles articulate the
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basic assumption that in the OTC derivative markets,

participants transact business at arm's length basis. As
such,

each particpant is itself responsible for

understanding the proposed derivative transaction and its
attendant risks and obtaining the additional information or

independent professional assistance required to do so 728

.

it underscores that participants should act

Further,

honestly and in good faith in all dealings and should
always seek to clarify the precise nature of their

relationships with their counterparties in writing. The

Derivatives Policy Group's analytical framework consists of
four interrelated components 729
1.

:

Management Controls. This component consists of the

implementation of internal management controls for

monitoring and measuring the various risks to which
may be exposed as

a

a

firm

result of dealings in OTC derivative

products, and the inclusion of an external audit and

verification process 730

.

For example,

regarding liquidity

risk, procedures should be in place to measure and provide

for potential funding requirements that might arise as a

result of the impact of market movements on cash flows and

collateral and margin requirements in light of mismatches
in the timing of offsetting payment and delivery

obligations 731

.

These controls, many of which are already in

place, will be implemented individually by each firm and

.
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are designed to effectuate prudent risk management

practices.
2.

Enhanced reporting. This component consists of the

periodic submission to the SEC and the CFTC of a series of
new quantitative reports covering credit risk exposures

arising from OTC derivative activities and related

information 732
3.

.

Evaluation of risk in relation to capital. This

component includes the development of a framework for

estimating market and credit risk exposures arising from
OTC derivative activities 733
4.

.

Counterparty relationships. This element of the

framework embodies guidelines for professional

intermediaries with respect to their relationships with

nonprofessional counterparties in connection with OTC
derivatives
For these purposes,

OTC derivative products include:

interest rate, currency, equity and commodity swaps, OTC
options and currency forwards 734

5.

.

Bank for International Settlements

("BIS")

The G-10 central bank governors have been considering
a range of issues

related to derivatives activities 735

.

The

Committee on Banking Supervision and the International

Organization of Securities Commissions each issued in July,
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1994,

documents providing risk management guidelines for

derivatives to banks and securities firms and their
supervisors 736

.

The guidelines stress the importance of

sound internal risk management by dealers and end-users of

derivative instruments with key elements including:

(i)

oversight by boards of directors and senior management
through timely reporting under an independent risk

management function;

(ii)

a

risk management process

involving prudent risk limits, sound measurement procedures
and information systems, and continuous risk monitoring and

reporting; and (iii)

audit procedures 737

.

comprehensive internal controls and
The guidelines also presents sound

practices for management of credit, market, liquidity,
operational, and legal risks involved in derivative

activities 738

.

In December 1994,

the Committee issued

another report, called "Prudential Supervision of Banks'

Derivative Activities." 739 This report provides an overview
of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord and other past and current

projects on the G-10 central banks that address derivative
activities. On December 11,

1995,

the Governors of the G-10

central banks endorsed a proposal by the Committee to amend
the 1988 Basle Capital Accord to take into account market

risk 740

.

The capital standards which are to be implemented

fully by bank supervisors by the end of 1997, would apply
to market risks associated with foreign exchange,
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commodities, options,

and trading activities of

internationally active banks. Banks would have to meet
certain quantitative standards to ensure measures of market
risk are sufficiently robust and consistent across

institutions, as well as qualitative standards for their

risk management systems, such as an independent risk

control unit with active involvement of senior management
in risk management 741

.

C.

REGULATION BY THE REGULATORS

1.

Introduction

Organized exchanges where derivatives can be traded,
establish rules and procedures that apply to all members as
well as to individuals and firms participating in option

transactions 742

.

Rule violations may be punishable by fines

and/or suspensions 743

.

The Options Clearing Corporation also

regulates its members to help ensure that all activities in
the option markets are proper and do not pose a risk to the

market's viability 744

2.

.

Margin Rules Applied by Futures and Options

Exchanges
As noted earlier,

key tools to affect trading and

reduce risk are the margin rules and marking-to-market
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method. Futures and Options exchanges,

supervised by their

regulators, usually set margin rules for their brokers'

transactions with them or with their clearinghouse and for
the brokers'
-

customers 745

.

Margin Rules for Customers' Futures Contracts

For customer's futures contracts,

long and short positions

are subject to margin rules in the United States. At the

time of the purchase, a customer buying a position pays an

initial margin that is a share of today'

price 746

.

s

cash future

The amount is usually a small percentage and it

varies depending upon whether the position is a hedge or

speculative and on the contract's variability 747

.

The

customer may give cash or securities. The maintenance

margin is set daily against the current market value of the
contract, which is marked-to-market daily 748

.

Any loss in

value is deducted entirely from the margin account and any
gain is added. This is called the variation 749

.

The broker

passes the variation to the exchange, which in turn passes
it to the broker on the other side of such a transaction,

for the customer. So any shift raises one margin account

and lowers the other. Whenever a customer's margin account
falls below the minimum maintenance level, the broker makes
a

margin call and the customer must return the margin

deposit to its initial level 750

.

s
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Margin Rules for Brokers' Futures Contracts

A member broker

clearing member) has many customer

(or

accounts as well as its own proprietary accounts. Futures

exchange clearinghouses set margins for member broker'
futures contracts 751

.

The clearinghouse usually calculates

gains or losses on each broker's total long positions and
on its total short positions in each contract at the end of
the trading day 752

.

Some net the sums, offsetting gains in

short or long against losses in long or short 753

.

The

clearinghouse then, adjusts the broker's clearing margin
account for each contract by the gain or loss and the

broker tops up or withdraws funds as appropriate 754
To mitigate systemic risk,

.

it would be a good policy to

calculate positions and margin requirements not by the end
of the day but make also at least one intra-day assessment.
-

Margin Rules for Options

When calls and puts are purchased, the option price must be

paid in full. Investors are not allowed to buy options on
margin. This is because options already contain substantial

leverage 755

.

Buying on margin would raise this leverage to

an unacceptable level 756

.

When an investor writes an option,

he or she is required to maintain funds in a margin

account. This is because the investor's broker and the

exchange want to be satisfied that the investor will not
default if the option is exercised 757

.

Regulation

T of the
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Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Federal Reserve to

regulate the extension of credit in the United States 758

.

This authority extends to the regulation of margin credit
on transactions in stocks and options 759

3.

.

The National Futures Association

(NFA)

Created in 1982, the National Futures Association is
an organization of individuals and firms that participate
in the futures industry 760

.

The NFA is a self-regulatory

agency which objective is to prevent fraud and manipulation
as well as to protect the public interest 761

.

The NFA

requires registration of its members who must meet strict

requirements and pass an examination 762

.

No NFA member may

accept a transaction from anyone other than an NFA

member 763

.

Like the CFTC, the NFA monitors trading and

identify rule violations as well as impose disciplinary
action 764

.

Thus,

it relieves the CFTC of some of this

responsability and turns the regulatory authority over to
the market participants themselves. The National Futures

Association ("NFA")

,

the industry's largest self-regulatory

body, has adopted a "know your customer" rule 765

,

which

requires members to obtain specified information from
customers,

including income, net worth, and prior

investment and futures trading experience, prior to opening
an account.
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4.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission

(CFTC)

The CFTC is given exclusive jurisdiction over

transactions in commodity futures contracts and commodity
options, which generally must be traded on a board of trade
or exchange and are subject to the requirements of the

CFTC 766

.

The Commodity Exchange Act 767

("CEA")

,

provides that

all transactions in commodity futures contracts and

commodity options, with certain exceptions, must occur on
or be subject to the rules of contract markets subject to

the supervision of the CFTC 768

.

The Commodity Futures

Trading Commission is responsible for licensing futures
exchanges and contracts 769

The CFTC also approves all terms

.

and conditions of each proposed contract as well as

modifications of the terms of existing contracts 770
approved by this agency,
purpose,

.

To be

contract must have an economic

a

i.e that it can be used for hedging,

contrary to the "public interest" 771

and not be

The CFTC is

.

responsible for ensuring that the exchanges make price

information available to the public and establishes

position limits, the maximum number of contracts
can have at any one time 772

.

a

trader

The CFTC has the authority to

require exchanges to establish and enforce disciplinary
actions against members found to be in violation of the

exchange's rules 773

.

One of the

CFTC

s

primary

responsibilities is market surveillance 774

.

Federal law
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makes it a felony to attempt to manipulate the futures

market 775

The CFTC monitors trading for indications of

.

possible manipulation 776

.

In 1986,

Congress passed the

Futures Trading Act, which reauthorized the CFTC for three

more years and extended the agency'

powers to include

s

regulation of any futures transaction, whether conducted on
or off an exchange 777

.

In 1992,

a

new reauthorization bill

granted the Federal Reserve Board the authority to oversee
the setting of margin requirements on stock index

futures 778

.

However, the CFTC has always been a reluctant

regulator and for the most part, its views are that the

markets should regulate themselves 779
without

a

.

That argument is not

great deal of substance, but that position

exposes the financial system to a great deal of uncertainty
that has not generally been tolerated for other financial

instruments 780

Like the SEC, the CFTC has not established a

.

suitability rule for CFTC-regulated instruments 781

.

The

Commodity Exchange Act has anti-fraud provisions applicable
to the purchase or sale of futures contracts by futures

commission merchants and their associates as well as to

commodity trading advisors and their associates 782

.

The CFTC

also adopted an anti-fraud rule for commodity options

transactions 783

.

However, the CFTC has determined that a

futures commission merchant

w

does not violate Section 4b

of the Commodity Exchange Act, merely because he fails to
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determine whether
trading" 784

.

a

customer is suitable for commodity

As is the case with broker-dealers, a futures

commission merchant's misrepresentation of an unsuitable
investment is civilly actionable under the Commodity

Exchange Act if it constitutes fraud 785

While the CFTC has

.

decided that futures commission merchants have the
fiduciary duty to make full disclosures of material
facts 786

,

ultimately

,

the responsibility to judge the

suitability of investments apparently is on the informed
customer, given the CFTC's emphasis on risk disclosure 787

.

The CFTC requires the futures commission merchants and

CFTC-regulated firms to provide risk disclosure statements
prior to opening customer accounts 788

.

Required disclosures

direct the customer to the issue of suitability, often by

instructing the customer to determine whether the

transaction at issue is suitable for the customer 789

5.

The Securities Exchange Commission

.

(SEC)

The SEC has responsibility for oversight of most

options markets, and it performs many of the functions the
CFTC performs with futures markets 790

6.

.

The Gene ral Accounting Office

(GAP)

The rapid growth in the use of derivatives by

corporations has caught the accounting profession by

168

surprise 791

.

Derivative transactions had previously been

viewed as off-balance sheet activities 792 that were only

mentioned in footnotes to the financial statements of firms
dealing in derivatives 793

.

As noted previously, the footnote

provided very little data as to the amount of risk or
profits and losses from those instruments. It was at the
urging of the SEC that firms engaging in derivative
transactions have disclosed their profits and losses from
that activity 794

.

The GAO made recommendations to Congress,

the Federal bank supervisory agencies and the SEC to

strengthen the regulation and supervision of derivative
activities 795

.

The GAO report identifies boards of directors

and senior management of institutions that participate in
the derivatives market as primarily responsible for risk

management 796

.

The GAO report recommends that Congress

require federal regulation of the safety and soundness of
the fifteen major United States OTC derivative dealers.

It

also recommends that Federal supervisors and regulators

develop initiatives with industry representatives and
regulators from other countries to harmonize disclosure,
capital,

legal examination, and accounting standards for

derivatives. The GAO report concluded that gaps in

regulation threatened the integrity of the financial
markets and suggested that the sudden failure of a major
dealer in over-the-counter derivatives might cause market

169

liquidity problems which, in turn, would threaten federally
insured banks and the financial system as
failure,

a

whole 797

.

Such a

the report stated, might require government

intervention and even

a

taxpayer bailout 798

.

The report

urged Congress to regulate currently unregulated activities
of securities firms and insurance companies 799

.

The report

noted that the gaps in regulation pertained mostly to
securities firms and insurance companies and not banks 800

.

Nevertheless, House banking Committee Chairman Henry

Gonzalez and Representative Jim Leach introduced a bill
that would require banks to disclose more information about

their derivative activities 801

.

CHAPTER IX:
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

A.

CONGRESS' INITIATIVES

-

CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION

While the regulatory community is struggling to foster
the development of adequate risk-control tools, Congress is

nervously watching events like the Bankers Trust
litigation, Orange County and the precipitous collapse of

Barings PLC and considering whether more rigid controls are
necessary. Banking regulators have been attempting to

regulate derivative activities and have asked Congress not
to interfere 802

.

But some members of Congress continue to

feel that additional legislation is necessary 803

.

A series

of bills brought up during the 103rd congressional session
is indicative of Congress'

concern over the state of the

industry and the magnitude of losses market participants
have recently sustained 804

.

Some members of the Congress

believe that congressional action is necessary to bring
about uniform and detailed disclosure by banks of

derivative product activities 805

.

Disclosure requirements

would allow banking regulators to discern both the risks to
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the banking system as a whole and to individual

institutions 806

regulation 807

.

.

Congress is also contemplating additional

In the House of Representatives,

3

bills on

derivatives have been introduced.
1.- House Banking Committee Chairman Leach introduced

the "Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight

Act of 1995" the so-called Leach Bill. Leach proposes to
set up a new Commission the FDC

Commission

-

-

Federal Derivatives

comprised of the various banking regulators

and new derivatives self-regulatory organizations
(SRO's)

808
.

The members of the FDC would be: the Chairman of the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the

Comptroller of the Currency; the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision; the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Chairman of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and the Secretary
of the Treasury 809

.

The FDC would be required to establish

uniform regulations regarding derivative activities by
banks 810

.

The FDC would have the authority to establish

principles and standards related to capital, accounting,
disclosure and suitability 811

.

Each regulatory agency would

then adopt implementing regulations. Under Representative
Leach'

s

plan,

the FDC would have discretion to establish
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specific disclosure requirements 812 and would be expected to

make recommendations to protect against systemic risk 813

.

The FDC would be responsible for setting standards

relating to:

(1)

the amount of capital a bank must hold

before engaging in derivative activity;

disclosure
and

(3)

(2)

the amount of

bank must make regarding derivative activity;

a

any appropriate regulatory action needed for

adequate supervision of banks engaged in derivative

activity 814

.

The FDC is also required to establish uniform

reporting systems for federal and state regulators 815
Further,

.

the FDC must sponsor training programs for bank

examiners to improve their ability to identify and assess
risks posed by derivative activities 816

.

Uniform disclosure

and training rules would create greater coordination and

cooperation among the regulators and would ensure that
derivative activities of institutions subject to different
regulators are regulated similarly 817

.

The bill also

requires banks to disclose the amount, nature, and terms of
the derivatives that they hold 818

.

Banks must disclose:

(1)

the gross fair market value of any holdings they had in

derivatives;
derivatives;

(2)
(3)

the revenue gains and losses from

net credit exposure under a bilateral

netting contract; and

(4)

remaining terms of maturity of

any derivative held by a bank 819

.

The purpose of these

disclosure requirements is to allow regulators to better
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understand the derivative activities of the bank and the
risks involved 820

.

The bill also calls for the banking

regulators to develop "emergency reporting" methods to be

used in the case of banking emergencies such as adverse
market conditions 621

.

Under this provision, regulators could

obtain any information from banks deemed "necessary" to
address the emergency 822

.

The bill grants banking regulators

greater enforcement powers because a failure to comply with
the statute would be considered an unsafe and unsound

practice and the regulators could assess civil penalties 823
Finally,

.

the bill attempts to assure that banks

dealing in derivatives are skilled in such dealings. The
bill bars banks from selling or buying derivatives unless a

sufficient number of directors are familiar with the risks

associated with the class of derivatives in which the bank
deals 824
2.

.

-

Representative Gonzalez introduced in January of

last year the "Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision

Act of 1995" which requires the Federal Bank supervision
and regulatory agencies to jointly establish principles and

standards relating to Capital, Accounting, Disclosure, Risk

Management and Suitability. Representative Gonzalez's bill
established disclosure requirements for banks engaged in
derivative activities instead of creating the FDC 825

.
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3.- Representative Markey introduced the "Derivatives

Dealers Act of 1995" which would amend the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 to include derivatives based on the
value of a security within the definition of the security.
4.- Another Member of Congress suggested that stop-

trading orders, or "circuit breakers" should be used during
periods of turmoil or unusual turbulence in the derivatives

market 826

.

Such a move would expand the use of circuit

breakers, which exchanges currently use to regulate the
large OTC market for derivatives.
5.- The Senate Bill: On July 18,

Senate Banking

1994,

Committee Chairman, Donald Riegle, introduced

a

bill

entitled the Derivative Supervision Act of 1994 827

.

This

bill forces banks to separate their derivatives activity

from other activities 828

.

The bill requires banks to set up

separate holding company subsidiaries in order to buy and
sell derivatives for a bank's own account 829

requires

.

The bill

banks to set up a management plan stating their

purpose in holding derivatives and how the holding is
consistent with the overall management plan 830

.

CHAPTER

X:

CONCLUSION

Banks are stepping out of their traditional role as

deposit-takers and lenders, and are moving along the road
toward becoming complete financial intermediaries embracing

derivatives as either dealers or end-users. Fundamental
economic forces have led to financial innovations that have

increased competition in financial markets. Greater

competition in turn has diminished the cost advantage banks
have had in acquiring funds and has undercut their position
in loan markets. As a result,

traditional banking has lost

profitability, and banks have begun to diversify into new
activities,

such as derivatives, that bring higher returns.

Derivative financial instruments have revolutionalized
the financial industry, providing both dealers and end-

users with sophisticated risk-management capabilities and
other benefits as well. Along with the rapid expansion of
the derivatives market has come the potential for

substantial disruptions, not only among individual market

players but throughout the financial markets worldwide. The

primary sources of the risk include the sheer volume of the
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derivatives market, the interlinking of markets and market
participants, the lack of regulatory supervision in the OTC
market,
a

and the concentration of derivatives activity among

relatively small number of major dealers. Investors also

face serious risks arising primarily from a lack of

sophistication and inadequate disclosure by dealers.
Industry players and many regulators do not want additional
regulation. Conversely, members of Congress feel increased

regulation is essential to the protection of the financial
system and the U.

S.

taxpayer

.

All of us know that there is

no greater enemy of the marketplace than a loss of

confidence in the market mechanism itself. While the

perceptions of the risks and challenges may differ, the
objectives of supervisors, financial institutions and users
are the same,

i.e,

maintaining

a

strong financial system

over the long run. The challenge for regulators is to

encourage financial market innovation without compromising
the elements which are essential to sound and orderly

markets. But one should keep in mind that there is no such
a

thing as "zero risk" and banking is not intended to be

a

risk free activity. Some view derivative activities as

highly speculative endeavors that greatly jeopardize
financial safety and soundness. The focus is placed on the

potential for weak or ill-managed institutions to suffer
large losses through derivatives trading, thereby
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endangering the safety of both the banking system and the
fund that backs federally insured deposits. In this regard,
some have favored restricting, or even banning, derivative

activities at insured commercial banks. Over the last five
years, however,

have learned

a

the banking industry and the regulators

great deal about the prudential regulation

of bank derivatives and have applied the lessons in their

practices. Banks have actually managed the risks associated

with derivatives almost better than the risks associated
with their basic lending activities. Financial institutions
have been known to fail due to losses from imprudent

lending activities. Recent failures involve losses due to

bad lending associated with real estate, the commercial
sector,

third world nations, and the energy and agriculture

sectors. Furthermore, it is likely that derivatives have

become so enmeshed in modern life that it is almost
impossible to go back and remove them from the markets.

Derivatives are now an integral and still-growing part
of the global financial marketplace. Many believe they are

essential for enhancing global market liquidity and

managing market risk. Indeed, derivative markets allow the
transfer of risk from those wanting to remove or decrease
it to those willing to assume or increase it.

They merely

allow risk to be passed from one investor to another.

Derivative markets neither generate nor dismantle wealth

,
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they merely relocate it. The benefits of derivatives,
however,

extend far beyond the market participants. The new

derivatives and financial products that exchanges
introduce, often make valuable and durable contributions to
the development of our capital markets which,

in turn,

promote economic welfare. Derivatives help financial
markets become more efficient and provide better

opportunities for managing risks. These benefits spill over
into society as a whole. The apologists who argue that "it
is not derivatives that are the problem,

it is how they are

used" are technically correct, just like America's pro-gun
lobby with its slogan "guns don't kill people, people do."
On balance,

the overall impact of derivatives on economic

activity has been positive and is likely to remain so.
Besides, the attention directed at derivatives in the

past few years has had a salutary influence on the entire

market over time because it helped increase understanding
among the purchasers of derivative products of their risks.
The investment banks,

accountants, big corporate users,

financial experts and economists and others who earn their
crust by working with derivatives will argue that mis-

selling is so rare. Indeed, disasters have typically been

caused by fraud, or by

a

derivative being misused or

misunderstood, not by its failure to do what it was

supposed to do. Moreover, in some of the best known
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fiascos,

such as Barings PLC, derivatives actually played

a

relatively small role, yet (in the popular press, at least)
got much of the blame. Likewise, until today no empirical

study has proved that derivatives increase volatility and
some have concluded that derivatives may even reduce it.
The impact could vary according to whether they are

used mainly to hedge risks or to speculate on markets.
Thus,

conclusive evidence that derivatives destabilise

markets is yet to be shown. So far, most of the debate
about derivatives has concentrated on the banking industry

because that is where they have been most heavily used and
because regulators fear that a disaster in a bank might
have knock-on effects throughout the financial system. The

different incidents due to derivative trades illustrate
today, more than ever before,

financial institution'

s

that it is critical that a

internal safety net

management and internal control systems

-

-

its risk

keeps pace with

the risks presented by this dynamic financial environment,

regardless of the institution's size. To keep pace with the
risks associated with the use of derivatives, several goals

should be embraced by every financial institution trading
derivatives. First, the development of a fully independent
risk management staff and a strong internal control

environment. It is essential that skilled people and

personnel with high integrity, are hired not only for the
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trading floors and risk management staffs, but also for
back offices and internal audit functions. Indeed, when

considering the importance of complex derivatives, there is
another kind of risk involved: intellectual risk, which
leads to the question: how well educated regarding

derivatives are personnel,

from the trader on the desk up

to the Board of Directors? Banks should also keep in mind

that risk management is a corporate management issue: the

board of directors is responsible for knowing in what the
institution is involved and for understanding the attendant
risks. Since regulatory agencies and their supervisors must

be in a position to assess the most sophisticated internal

sensitivity models used by banks to simulate changes in
their net worth arising from possible future changes in
asset prices, they must be able to fully understand the

complicated and technical systems used by the regulated
banks. In that regard, would any effort at regulation not
be hampered by the difficulty of obtaining highly and

technically qualified people? Would it not be difficult

-

if not impossible - for the regulatory agencies to attract

people with these scarce financial skills? Second, the

development and, in some cases, further enhancement of

measurement and monitoring techniques for all types of
risk,

including market risk and credit risk resulting from

derivative activities. An information system that is
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sophisticated is essential to risk management and to
development of effective stress testing and contingency

planning capabilities. Banks trading derivatives should be
equipped with elaborate analysis computer programs that

measure the potential risk of one-day price move to

a

specified level of probability. Upgrades in technology will
be needed in order to assure integration of computer

systems in a firm'

s

dealing with derivatives on a wide-

scale basis. Additionally, banks trading derivatives should
set up special computer programs which would enable

personnel and management staff to educate and train
themselves against a financial apocalyptic scenario. Like
in the aviation industry,

there is no room for error in the

huge derivatives industry. Third, and even more
fundamental,

is the critical assessment by the board of

directors and senior management of an institution's
tolerance for risk, ensuring that risk management and
internal control systems are commensurate with that level
of risk. Fourth,

it is self-evident that a full

appreciation of risk cannot be developed without accurate
information. Thus, there is little question in my mind
about the urgency of achieving dramatic progress in the
areas of financial disclosure and market transparency. A

striking aspect of the markets these last years has been
the periodic episodes of tremendous uncertainty as to the
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exact nature of market forces at work and the size of

overhanging positions. This uncertainty provided

a

fertile

ground for rumors about forced liquidation of financial
groups and the financial health of individual firms, and

created the potential for volatile and disorderly markets.
Sixth, netting is a powerful tool for market makers.

Legally binding netting of payments enables market makers
to reduce significantly the enormous sums that are at risk

on any given day. Seventh,

the derivatives business is

international. While American companies have been

maintaining leadership in the industry through constant
innovation, the ease with which the industry could move

off-shore limits Congress and regulators' room to maneuver.
Therefore, resolution of concerns should be achieved only

through a high level of international cooperation and
agreement. More work should be done at the G-10 central
banks. Eighth, derivative activities could be conducted by

separate subsidiaries. In the past, similar concerns than
those experienced in the derivatives market caused the

industry and the regulators to recommend that

nontraditional banking activities, such as those associated
with underwriting and dealing in corporate debt and equity
securities, be conducted only by well-managed and well-

capitalized banks in separate subsidiaries of the bank
holding company. Ninth, consolidation supervision need to
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be inplemented. We know that derivatives are not subject to

consolidated supervision and regulation. Because they take
place in a variety of exchange and OTC market environments,
the concerns over the potential risks associated with these

markets has been tempered by the recognition that any
attempt to regulate these markets in a consolidated fashion

may interfere with their efficient functioning and deprive
participants of their important risk-management benefits.
But what is the point of periodic bank examinations and

reporting requirements when the risk characteristics of

a

bank's proprietary trading position can be transformed
almost instantaneously through the use of derivative

products? Should banks not be required to report their
overall positions at least daily so that supervisors can
keep track of what is going on? The answer given by the

industry is that such an approach would place an impossible

burden on all concerned while generating more data than
anyone would know what to do with. Tenth, additional

regulation and guidelines do not seem to be necessary. The
existing regulatory framework addresses the issues and
provides adequate solutions, at least for exchange traded
derivatives. It ensures that banks manage the risks posed

by the use of derivatives so that they will be used safely
and soundly. Key components of risk management are an

independent risk management system,

a

strong internal
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control environment, and an integrated,

institution-wide

system for measuring and limiting risk. This means
sufficient separation of duties, complete separation of

front-office (trading) and back-office operations, a daily

reevaluation of trading positions independent of trading
personnel and management, and an independent validation
process for each step of the risk management process. Too

much regulation will not be an appropriate answer because
derivatives should stay innovative. Additional regulatory

legislation could move the industry offshore, and out of
the reach of U.S. regulatory jurisdiction and any bill that

imposes further restrictions on banks will send investors
to derivatives created by securities firms or other

financial businesses whose activities are less well

regulated than those of banks. Moreover, any effort to
restrict the ability of banks to engage in derivative

transactions would increase costs and burdens to the
industry and the communities served by these institutions.
The middle-ground between no action and heavy-handed

legislation would be more relevant and may direct us to
take action by only placing the relatively unsupervised OTC

dealers under the power of some existing regulatory agency,
and implementing set standards with respect to accounting

procedures, capital reserves, and corporate oversight

within the OTC industry. The Federal Reserve, the OCC and
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the FDIC guidelines require banks and other users to

establish written derivative policies and identify

associated fundamental risks. For banking supervisors,

probably the most important issue they face concerning
financial derivatives is what could go wrong to engender

systemic risk, the danger that disruptions or difficulties
at one institution could have a significant impact on other

financial institutions and through them on the overall
economy. The guidance appears to address the key safety and

soundness objectives of the Congress' concerns. On the
other hand, the over-the-counter market, being unregulated,
has shown a tremendous propensity to innovate by developing

new types of contracts such as swaps. Many would argue, and
I

do,

that this market should be regulated. Investments in

the OTC products should be controlled by the investment

management firms themselves who are directly accountable to
the marketplace and to investors.

In this market,

the role

of regulation is to ensure that investment companies

accurately and completely disclose both their objectives
and the types of investments they contemplate. It is the
role of the government to ensure that these companies

provide investors with

a

full and fair disclosure upon

which to base informed investment decisions. Despite the
rapid growth of derivatives and the great risks that may

accompany their use, banking regulators have not moved to
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prohibit or greatly restrict the use of derivatives. This
is not surprising. After all,

are the risks posed by

derivatives so fundamentally different from those posed by
other investments that a radical and different regulatory

approach is necessary? Lawmakers' concerns over banks'

activity in financial derivatives stems from the potential
to speculate in the derivatives market, which allows banks
to bet with federally insured deposits and,

with taxpayers'

ultimately,

funds. Although financial derivatives are

fairly new, their risks are not. They reflect essentially
the same basic risks that banks have always been facing.

Some derivative contracts are quite complex but a complex,

difficult to manage, option is embedded in every fixed-rate
home mortgage. Although some derivative instruments are

undoubtedly complex, exposure to derivatives risk does not
seem much different from exposure to many other bank
activities,

such as credit risk in a loan portfolio or

interest rate risk in a variety of fixed-income securities.
Banks can also achieve high leverage in a number of ways

other than through derivatives and can quickly change (or
increase)
Banks'

their risk exposure in many different ways.

recent push into derivative activities raises all of

the questions commonly raised when banks engage in new off-

balance-sheet activities. Instead of regulating bank's use
of derivatives, banking regulators have chosen to amend
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their capital adequacy standards to account for the risks

posed by derivatives. Requiring banks to hold adequate
capital promotes financial stability in two ways. First, it

provides
losses,

a

greater cushion with which banks can absorb

lessening the likelihood of failure. Second, with

more capital at risk, banks have less incentive to take

excessive risk because they will have more to loose if
their bets go wrong. /Another benefit is that regulation

need no longer restrict bank's activities. As long as banks
must hold sufficient capital against whatever activities
they engage in, taxpayers will be protected and banks will
have an incentive to avoid excessive risk taking. Further,

freedom to offer additional products and services will

better enable banks to compete with nonbank competitors and

with foreign banks. Another important component of

a

regulatory strategy to maintain bank soundness is

supervisory monitoring. Regulation must be able to keep
banks from changing their risk exposure after capital

requirements are determined. As we have learned from the
Barings' collapse, regulators must also ensure that

adequate internal controls are in place with regard to
asset quality and risk management procedures. Finally,

public disclosure of bank'

s

risk exposures would increase

market efficiency and bolster market discipline. Banks
should provide a meaningful depiction of the risks
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associated with their trading activities in off-balancesheet activities and of their ability to manage these
risks. More public information about the risks incurred by

banks will better enable stockholders, creditors and

depositors to evaluate and monitor banks, and will act as

a

deterrent to excessive risk taking. The regulation of banks
because they have deposit

is and remains essential,

insurance and direct access to the Federal Reserve's

discount window. At the same time, however, this

combination of deposit insurance and access to the Federal
Reserve'

s

discount window also can result in potential

problems because it may incite the banks and their
customers to inappropriately rely on such backing.
Therefore, banks may be willing to run greater risks in

their trading activities

-

in relation to their capital -

than otherwise would be the case. In addition, market

participants may prefer using banks for derivatives and
related trading activities simply because banks are

perceived to be safer counterparties. The current deposit
guarantee structure does reduce the probability of largescale bank panics but has also created new issues. Deposit

insurance effectively eliminates the discipline provided by
the market mechanism in encouraging banks to maintain

appropriate capital levels and restrict unnecessary risktaking. Because of the federal deposit guarantee,

some

189

government lawmakers now propose to restrict insured banks'
activities in financial derivative markets. Without federal

deposit guarantees, banks' activities would be disciplined
by depositors and the bank would take only calculated risks

because uninsured depositors, concerned about the safety of
their deposits, would provide the discipline necessary to

guide financial institutions in maintaining adequate

capital and limiting risk strategies. Further, the presence
of deposit guarantees may encourage banks to use

derivatives to pursue higher risk strategies, such as

speculating on the direction of interest rates or exchange
differentials, instead of using derivatives for hedging to
improve their management of financial risks.
So,

does the use of derivatives pose a serious threat to

the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system?
I

modestly do not view banks' derivatives activities

as a threat to financial stability.

Properly used and

regulated, derivatives can facilitate the management of

risk and increase the long-term viability of banks and the

financial system. On the other hand, the relative newness
of this market,

the fragmented regulatory responsibility,

the global trading and the competitive secrecy of many

transaction virtually precludes the possibility of getting
a

full picture of the derivative markets. But are these

really central issues? Would it not be more to the point to
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address the fundamental issue of whether banking groups

should be allowed to operate high-risk, purely speculative

non banking business at all?

I

believe that the primary

task of banks is to act as facilitators of the money

transactions on which personal, industrial, commercial and
governmental activities are based. Should the bank only be
the totally safe and reliable repository of our savings?

Have banks strayed too far from their primary task? Perhaps
the time has come to initiate a fundamental study of the

current structure of the banking and financial service
industries. For some time,

it seems to have become

fashionable to diversify into everything everywhere.

.

.
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ones. Stock Options are options on individual shares of common stock.
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by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and American Stock
Exchange. Since its establishment in 1974, the OCC has issued,
guaranteed, registered, cleared, and settled all transactions
involving listed options on all exchanges. Options are designated by
the name of the underlying common stock, the expiration month, the
Thus an IBM call
strike price, and the type of option (put or call)
option expiring in October with a strike price of 55 is referred to as
the "IBM October 55 Call." Stock Index Options are options in which
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